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Introduction
While deforestation pace in the Brazilian Amazon has slow down over the last
decade, many studies have pointed to an alarming increase in fire occurrence
even in areas where deforestation is decreasing (Aragao and Shimabukuro, 2010).
Fires, which are mainly of agricultural origin (Diaz et al., 2002), harm the natural
ecosystems, jeopardize the environmental services they provide and damage natural
resources the communities use (Ferreira et al., 2012). Fires are also an important
social issue, as they destroy agricultural production systems and infrastructures,
and cause local populations to su↵er from serious economic losses (Cochrane, 2003;
de Mendonc¸a et al., 2004; Diaz et al., 2002; Nepstad et al., 1999).
Traditionally, smallholders burn plots of land surrounded by moist forest where
few or no fire control measures are needed because non-degraded forests are not
easily flammable (Cochrane, 2000; Nepstad et al., 1999). However, because of
forest degradation due to logging activities, extreme weather events (e.g. El
Nin˜o), climate change, and previous fires, forests and surrounding landscapes have
become increasingly flammable (Nepstad et al., 1999; Soares-Filho et al., 2012).
Unless fire control measures are implemented, there is a high risk of fire spreading
out from agricultural areas and accidentally burning surrounding areas.
Responsibility for controlling wildfire risk is generally considered to have both
public and private components, because actors all contribute to this risk and to
varying degrees share the consequences of destructive outcome (Winter and Fried,
2000). As such, fire control is a typical collective action dilemma: farmers would
all benefit from fire control, but such control has an associated cost, making it
unlikely that any farmer individually will control it unless an e↵ective coordination
mechanism will be operating. The unwillingness of one farmer to invest in fire
control may result in damaging neighboring properties (Bowman et al., 2008;
Nepstad et al., 1999; Simmons et al., 2004). Nonetheless, very few studies have
investigated fire control, and among them, only two framed this issue as a problem
of collective action (Carmenta et al., 2013; Simmons et al., 2004). These studies
addressed the importance of commitment toward community and social capital in
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limiting fire contagion, referring to seminal works on natural resources management
(Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001; Ostrom, 2000a), but the results regarding possible
links between social organization and fire control were not conclusive (Carmenta
et al., 2011; Simmons et al., 2004).
Although much literature has explored the conditions that explain the success
of already existing collective actions in the management of natural resources
(Ostrom, 2009), grasping what determines the emergence of new collective norms
and rules remains a big challenge for social sciences, especially if explicit norms
have not yet emerged and collective action is not observable (Ostrom, 2010). Even
when engaging in collective action may appear to be a win-win solution, individual
choices depend on how each actor perceives the situation, and this will determine
the outcome of collective action (Brewer and Kramer, 1986). The complexity of
the interaction within a socio-ecological-system, the cognitive limits of actors and
communication di culties challenge the emergence of a su cient reason to engage
in collective action (Bromley, 2006; Bromley, 2008).
In this work we analyze what brings smallholders to control fire and whether
collective action has a role in this fire control. We argue that a successful collective
action is an important determinant of fire control. Moreover we discuss to what
extent collective action may contribute to solve the fire control problem.
Chapter 1 presents the general context by providing an overview of existing
literature related to fire use and fire control and inform on the purpose and
hypothesis of this work.
Chapter 2 presents the three methods of analysis used in this study and
how they are interlinked. A review of collective action thinking provides the
starting point to reflect on the relevance of new questions relating to collective
action, and to the need for new tools. The methodological choice of mixed
method triangulation takes into account the need for qualitative and quantitative
analyses. We discuss the use of in depth interviews and Q methodology coupled
with econometric analysis. An epistemological ground to ensure methodological
coherence is provided. A methodological framework shows how this procedure is
consistent with the objective of studying collective action as a potential solution.
Chapter 3 analyses the role of institutions and the local context through
a qualitative enquiry conducted in two municipalities of the Easter Amazon,
Paragominas and Ipixuna do Para´, in the so called Arc of Deforestation. By
means of a collective action framework we identify the most important factors
a↵ecting collective action, how local institutions a↵ect fire control and how the
latter relates with production and conflicts in the communities. We also link local
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policies and smallholder perceptions on fire control. Our study shows that the
policies developped by Ipixuna do Para´ seem to have provided an important basis
for fire control among smallholders.
Chapter 4 provide a formalization of the main issues highlighted in Chapter 1
and 3. First we provide a description of the strategic interaction arising in fire
control choice reformulating Shafran’s (2008) argument of interdependent choice
in setting fire defensible space around houses at the wild-urban interface. Secondly
we describe a lock-in situation in which fire risk constrains over the choice of crops
and may impede a transition out of fire use. Thirdly, we reformulate Bowman et
al. (2008) model of the investment in firebreaks to understand the consequences of
endogenous risk and fire sensitiveness of di↵erent crops on the optimal investment
in fire control measures. Based on this formalization, an empirical model is
estimated using data collected by a large project named Sustainable Amazon
Network (Rede Amazonia Sustentavel). Along with the variables already reported
in the literature we estimate the impact of trust and social capital on five fire
control measures.
In Chapter 5 we analyse how the perception of fire risk and of its controllability
a↵ects the likelihood of collective action. Framing fire risk involves understanding
the characteristics of the ecological system (Nepstad et al., 1999) but also the
farmers’ practices, social representations and social relations (Carmenta et al.,
2013). Thus, depending on the individual’s environment, social ties and experience,
perceptions will di↵er as well as preferences regarding the type of governance
which could improve fire control. To understand how individuals frame this risk
and the e↵ectiveness of collective action to control it, we used the Q-method
(Brown, 1980; Barry and Proops, 1999; Ockell, 2008) to elicit actors’ mental
models. We found four distinct discourses showing substantial heterogeneity of
views about fire use, fire risk, and norms about fire prevention and control, but
consistent beliefs that fire control is essential. This suggests that clear fire control
norms have not yet emerged and that there are competing logics. The results of
Q methodology show also that a high-perceived risk limits collective action.
Finally Chapter 6 summarizes the man findings, discusses policy implications
and identifies future research issues.
3
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Chapter 1
Fire risk and smallholders in the
Brazilian Amazon
1.1. Introduction
Amazon is the largest forest in the world, and hosts one of the greatest agricultural
colonization frontiers (Assunc¸a˜o et al., 2012; Nepstad et al., 1999). However,
despite the great economic development of the last two decades, the poverty
headcount in the Brazilian Amazon region is still constant and definitely higher
than in the rest of the country. Between 1990 and 2005 poverty rate was still 45%
while it fell in the rest of the country from 42% to 31% (Celentano et al., 2012).
Moreover the region is now confronted to ample environmental problems. In 2007
the International Panel on Climate Change stated that 17% of world green-house
gases emissions were caused by deforestation and biomass decomposition (Susan,
2007), 75% of Brazilian CO2 emission is being caused by deforestation (Barreto and
Araujo, 2012). But while after severe command and control policies deforestation
has fallen by 80% since 2004, fires are still increasing, also in reduced deforestation
areas (Aragao and Shimabukuro, 2010), threatening the benefits from avoided
deforestation (Barlow et al., 2012). The trend is probably destined to an upward
sloping path since recent reports indicate an increasing risk of drought and risk of
“mega-fires” (Aragao et al., 2008; Carr et al., 2009; Malhi et al., 2009; Williams
et al., 2011). On the one hand after the big fires of 1998 controlling forest fire
become a priority in the national and international policy arena (Ariaga, 2002;
Carmenta et al., 2013); on the other, little knowledge exists about the causes of
fires (Carmenta et al., 2011; Carmenta et al., 2013), and the increasing threat of
wildfire indicate that current policy measures are failing in addressing this issue
(Aldersley et al., 2011; Alencar et al., 2004).
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1.2. Deforestation edges and fires
1.2.1. The edge of deforestation
After Kyoto agreements in 1997 the issue of carbon emissions has become much
debated at the international level. Reducing deforestation became a political
priority for Brazil: an internal pressure to deforestation reduction emerged due to
the disruptive e↵ects of extreme climatic events and the decline in the belief that
deforestation was essential to growth (Barreto and Araujo, 2012; Sparovek et al.,
2012).
In response to this pressure policy makers started thinking about deforestation
reduction as an achievable goal (Sorrensen, 2009). Since 2000 Brazil greatly
increased the area of Indigenous Reserves and Protected Areas (Soares-Filho
et al., 2010; Toni, 2011). In 2004 a new policy bent took place in response
to a new deforestation peak (figure1.1). A new action plan (PPCDAm) solved
was launched to coordinate di↵erent policies and thus try to solve a problem of
contradicting policies among federal, country and municipal level; and the upgrade
in satellite monitoring technique (Brito and Barreto, 2011), along with police
and army control intensification, allowed a more e↵ective command and control
policy implementation (Assunc¸a˜o et al., 2012; Barreto and Araujo, 2012). In
2007 another deforestation peak occurred following cattle and soy price increase
(fig.1). A new PPCDAm phase, named “Arco de Fogo” (Fire Arc), engaged in
strong measures of command and control against big cattle producers, including
also strong economic disincentives regarding credit and market access: a black
list of most deforesting municipalities was created in order to prioritize controls,
credit restrictions and land regularization (Assunc¸a˜o et al., 2012; Barreto and
Araujo, 2012). Since 2006 a soy moratorium and a beef embargo took place in
order to make producers as well as all the production chain responsible (Barreto
and Araujo, 2012; Nepstad et al., 2009).
In 2009, as part of its policy against climate change, Brazil voluntarily commit-
ted to reduce deforestation rate by 80% by 2020 with respect to an average baseline
of the 1996-2005 period (Law no. 12.187/2009 and Decree no. 7.390/2010).Fol-
lowing the Arco de Fogo operation, by 2012 Brazil had managed to reduced
deforestation by 76% of the ultimate goal of 2020 (INPE 2013).
Brazilian policies have thus become are an example of e cacy and e ciency in
reducing deforestation rapidly in a di cult context. Figure 1.1 shows how policies
initially took advantage of the soy and beef price fall, and then, with the second
PPCDAm phase, broke the vicious causality among world agricultural prices and
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deforestation (Assunc¸a˜o et al., 2012). Nevertheless market led policies had the
side e↵ect to leave behind smallholders in this transition, whose motivations are
more related with social and livelihood issues (Coudel et al., 2012).
Figure 1.1: Deforestation trend and the e↵ect of policies on correlation with soy
and beef prices.
Source: (Barreto and Araujo, 2012)
1.2.2. The surge of fires
While deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon has decreased by more than 80%
since 2004, many studies have pointed to an alarming increase in fire occurrence
even in areas where deforestation is decreasing (Aragao and Shimabukuro, 2010).
Fires, which are mainly of agricultural origin (Diaz et al., 2002), harm the natural
ecosystems, jeopardize the environmental services they provide and damage natural
resources the communities use (Figure1.2) (Ferreira et al., 2012). Fires are also
an important social issue, as they destroy agricultural production systems and
infrastructures, and cause local populations to su↵er from serious economic losses
(Cochrane, 2003; de Mendonc¸a et al., 2004; Diaz et al., 2002; Nepstad et al.,
1999). Moreover forest degradation caused by wildfires has the additional e↵ect of
reducing evapotranspiration, reducing forest cover, reducing rains and increasing
flammability at the local level starting a vicious cycle (Nepstad et al., 2001;
Nobre et al., 1991; Shukla et al., 1990). Indeed unless extreme (but frequent)
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conditions happen, like the El Nin˜o event, moist forest is not flammable (Simmons
et al., 2004; Wetzel and Omi, 1991). But after logging disturbance forest became
vulnerable to raster fires, starting the following vicious cycle: woodsman open
roads and implement selective cut in order to extract trees, this activity increase
tree mortality, reduce humidity, and increase flammability, driving up to crown
fires removing forest cover, the most ecologically disruptive fire event (Barlow et
al., 2012; Nepstad et al., 1999).
Figure 1.2: Raster forest fire originating from pasture renewal
Amazonian smallholders and fire use
Fire is widely used in agriculture in tropical regions, making it di cult to prohibit
its use (Sorrensen, 2009). Fire is a “voluntary worker”, e↵ective in clearing land
for pastures and crops, control weeds and fertilize soil at a low cost,(Pollini, 2009;
Siegert et al., 2001). Agricultural populations in the Amazon use fire in primary
forests in order to clear and fertilize soil at a low cost and in deforested lands
to clear pastures or to prepare land for crops. Slash and burn in the Amazon
is an important agriculture cost-saving technique: the livelihood of smallholders
strongly depends on it, mainly because of lack of acceptable alternatives (Coudel
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et al., 2013; Mistry and Bizerril, 2011; Sorrensen, 2009). Fire is also a culturally
embedded practice, since it is a fundamental part of the swidden cycle of roc¸a
(Carmenta et al., 2013), the agricultural plot dedicated to annual cultures. roc¸a
appear to cover an irreplaceable role in familiar agriculture because it traditionally
provides the main part of the everyday meal: rice, beans, manioc flour and
corn (Jackson and al., 2007; LIMA, 2005). As they are the basis of traditional
livelihoods, roc¸a play an important role in improving resilience to external shocks
(Adams, 2009; Parker, 1989).
Recently, environmental policies have supported intensification of land use
by large-scale landowners (Barreto and Araujo, 2012), but have done little to
target smallholders whose livelihoods still largely depend on agriculture and in
particular on the use of slash and burn: di↵erent alternatives have been suggested
to avoid using fire, including mulching or fertilizers (Denich et al., 2004; Denich
et al., 2005; Kato et al., 1999), or other cultivation systems, based on perennial
crops (Hoch et al., 2012). However, given the lack of e↵ective complementary
measures regarding market access and technical assistance (Hoch et al., 2012;
Pollini, 2009; Sorrensen, 2009), these options are seldom viable (Bo¨rner et al.,
2007; Villemaine et al., 2012), and fire is still the most cost-e↵ective technique
(Pollini, 2009). Moreover, in fire-prone areas, investing in costly alternatives like
perennials appears to be discouraged by the risk of destruction by accidental fires
(Nepstad et al., 2001; Nepstad et al., 1999; Pokorny et al., 2012). A transition out
of slash and burn by smallholders is not likely to occur in the short term (Carr et
al., 2009).
The origin of fires
The practice of swidden fire either by Amazonian smallholder and big landholders
is largely spread as an essential and cost-e↵ective agricultural technique with a
high cultural value. However swidden fires are responsible for a multiplicity of
ignition sources and may cause accidental wildfires, but the two types of fires are
distinct events. Indeed fire risk does not derive directly from fire use, but from the
lack of adequate fire control. However wild and swidden fires have been confused
in literature for a long time (Carmenta et al., 2011), leading to stigmatization and
misunderstanding about fire practices and wildfire causes (Coudel et al., 2013).
Since the nineties hotspots and scar images obtained through satellite monitoring
are the main tool to study fires, but satellites do not reveal the motivation that
induce to start a fire nor whether a fire is a voluntary or an accidental one
(Sorrensen, 2009). Based on a large-n literature review Carmenta et al. (2011)
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showed that only few field studies exist about fires in the Amazon, and that
little knowledge exits about their causes. Fire episodes are usually associated
to high anthropic pressure, logging, agricultural activity and increasing forest
flammability (Davidson et al., 2012; Sorrensen, 2009; Uhl and Buschbacher, 1985).
But few or no studies deepened actor habits, rationale and motivations. Moreover
studies concerned fires for opening and maintaining pastures by big landholders
(Carmenta et al. 2011). On the one hand literature from ecology, agronomy and
social sciences provided wide evidences of the disaster caused by fires, pushing
further research towards alternatives to fire use and radicalizing policies to against
fire use (Coudel et al., 2013). On the other, however, there is little research about
the origins of fires in the Amazon, and there is still no agreement on the conditions
under which fire use is e↵ectively more environmental harmful than intensive
farming (Chazdon, 2008; Omeja et al., 2012). The sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992)
claims that human attention is biased toward the e↵ects of risky events more than
on the causes and symptoms of the risk. This is the case with respect to fires
in the Amazon: the International and Brazilian discourses around deforestation
and fire drove toward an excessive faith in technological advancement on remote
sensing techniques. But geographical data, even if crossed with socio-demographic
space wide data (as demographic density), has no capacity to reveal any insight
of the causes and symptoms of fire use and fire control (Hayes and Raja˜o, 2011).
That is why there is a strong need for field based studies (Carmenta et al., 2011)
about the causes of fires.
1.3. Fire control and smallholders
Lack of fire control is an important driver of forest degradation, a risk for neighbor-
ing properties and protected areas and a disincentive to investment on properties
(Barlow et al., 2012; Cochrane, 2003; Cochrane et al., 1999; Davidson et al., 2012;
Mistry and Bizerril, 2011; Nepstad et al., 1999; Pokorny et al., 2012; Sorrensen,
2009). Pokorny et al. (2012) and de Mendonc¸a et al. (2004) found respectively
that 66% and 88% of the interviewed producers experienced damages caused by
fire. Indeed local farmers are probably the most interested agents in controlling fire
as they are directly damaged by uncontrolled fire (Barlow et al., 2012; Bowman et
al., 2008; Cochrane, 2003; Davidson et al., 2012; de Mendonc¸a et al., 2004; Mistry,
1998; Nepstad et al., 1999; Pokorny et al., 2012; Sorrensen, 2009).
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1.3.1. Fire control as compliance to the law
Use of fire in general for agricultural and cattle breeding purposes is tolerated by
the federal law, conditioned on a licensing system organized by the environmental
secretary of each state (art. 27 Forest Code: Federal Law 4771/65). Country or
municipal level can apply stricter regulation, for instance, totally prohibiting its
use.
The Brazilian Forest Code already makes burning without specific precaution
illegal (Article 22, Forest Code/1934), require licences to use fire (Article 27),
and makes some fire control measures compulsory (Presidential Decree 2661/98;
Portaria IBAMA 94/98; Presidential Decree 3179/98). Although the risk of high
fines and penalties up to imprisonment compliance is still low, and fires tend to
prevail.
Since satellite data are not su ciently disaggregated1 to be reliable for fire
originating in small plots (Nepstad et al., 1999) it is not possible to estimate the
relative impact of smallholders and big landholders action on fire risk. However
the formers are more dependent and less prone to abandon fire practices, and the
cost of setting fire control measures is higher for them than for big landholders
(Nepstad et al., 1999).
On the one hand big producers are addressed by several policies: controlled
through quasi-instant satellite monitoring data, they must hold a special land
entitlement accounting for forest surface on the property (CAR) to access markets
(Barreto and Araujo, 2012); moreover if using fire, they need a fire licensing system
and usually have the means to control fires (Nepstad et al., 1999). On the other
hand, smallholders face higher fire control costs, and are less moved by current
policies: implementation of controls, fines and licensing toward smallholders is
much less cost-e↵ective for the government because it would probably need much
more resources devoted to enforcement activities (Bo¨rner et al., 2011) as property
are numerous and distributed. Smallholder’s compliance is di cult to be achieved
also because current policy setting delegitimizes slash and burn, considered as a
primitive practice, and no concrete alternatives are furnished (Carmenta et al.,
2013; Coudel et al., 2013).
After the mega fire devastating 36.000 km2 of forest in Roraima between
February and March of 1998, ProArco, a ten-year urgency program, was launched
to improve fire control. It included a large activity of dissemination competences
1 The pixel resolution in the latest deforestation and fire maps is of one square kilometers
(http://modis.gsfc.nasa.gov/), and fires are individuated only if exceeds a size of 1mx30m (INPE
2012)
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for fire control using an educational and participatory approaches (Nepstad et
al., 1999; Sorrensen, 2009). The program was carried on by the Minister of the
Environment and by IBAMA, the National Agency for the Environment. Notions
about fire management were largely communicated through radio, television and
in printed guides distributed by NGOs and the government technical assistance
(Costa, 2004).
The fire control measures disseminated by ProArco are not limited to the
construction of physical barriers such as firebreaks, but also concern with meteo-
rological and socio-institutional measures (Carmenta, 2013). Adequate weather
conditions relate to humidity, wind intensity and direction. Farmers should wait
for the first rains of the season to increase humidity of the surrounding forest,
and light fires only in the late hours of the days, usually colder and less windy. In
order to avoid high and fast flames backfire is also suggested. Socio-institutional
measures relates to the positioning of the area burnt with respect to other plots,
agreement in the community with respect to the time and the location of fires, a
minimum of four persons monitoring the burn, and neighbors alert before burning,
all that in order to increase vigilance on burnt and avoid fire spread in the adjacent
properties. Moreover the farmer must look after the fire for as long as it burns
and carry water in site.
These and many other norms and praxis have been studied and suggested
to smallholders (Carvalho et al., 2007; Costa, 2006; Mistry, 1998), and although
NGO-led programs have been shown to be successful locally (Carvalho et al., 2002;
Nepstad et al., 1999), other studies show that the adoption of these measures is
relatively limited (Costa, 2004), partly because they do not match local knowledge
(Carmenta et al., 2013; Mistry, 1998), or simply because they are too expensive.
Nepstad et al. (1999) estimated that the cost of building firebreaks for a small
producer can reach up to 61% of his profits.
Carmenta (2013) evidenced a policy-practice disparity due to the miscompre-
hension of local technical capacities, local requirement for a “good burn” and
culturally inappropriate rules: law requires to built a 2-6 meters wide firebreak
around the burn area, this is nearly unfeasible with local technical capacity and
resource availability. Moreover farmers lack confidence in firebreaks e↵ectiveness
because of careless neighbors and the wind carrying sparks from afar fires. Burning
in cooler hours without wind does not lead to a “good burn” since a lot of fuel
stand unburned and more work is needed to chop logs and to root out unwanted
weeds and wild plants after fires and during the year. For the same reason lighting
fire against the wind is not practiced. However fire is usually lighted on all the sides
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of a plot, originating a kind of backfire. The major cost related to the compliance
with socio-institutional measures relates to the unpredictability of weather events.
It is rare that people get the license to use fire or even alert neighbors formally at
least 3 days in advance, as required by law, because this would imply the ability
to foresee the optimal weather condition to burn. Moreover fire contagion events
are not perceived as a criminal act: in the sample of Carmenta (2013) nobody
ever asked for compensation for damages or reported careless neighbors.
Finding a solution to fires need to overcome the policy-practice gap. While fire
is conceived as a risk and policies are oriented towards its elimination, fire is still a
primary livelihood tool for the rural population of the Amazon region (Carmenta,
2013; Coudel et al., 2013). Policy panaceas are advised against (Ostrom et al.,
2007), and a clear understanding of fire control choice and of fire management
practices is of crucial importance to ensure local livelihood as well as policy goals
on fire management (Mistry and Bizerill 2011, Carvalho et al., 2002; Costa, 2006;
Nepstad et al., 1999).
1.3.2. Fire control as a risk mitigation strategy: the limits
of current literature
As far as my knowledge goes, only three models try to explain the factors a↵ecting
the decision to set fire control measures, discussed in Bowman et al. (2008),
Carmenta et al. (2013) and Simmons et al. (2004). Beyond them, Shafran
(2008) o↵er an interesting discussion of the positive externalities arising in fire
management with respect to the decision to set a defensible space around houses
at the wild urban interface, and the mechanism is close to the fire control choice.
Morello (2013) looks for the existence of externalities and neighborhood e↵ects in
land use decision.
Bowman et al. (2008) built a constrained household model and consider that
the allocation of labor to firebreaks depends on the opportunity cost of labor
and land allocated to firebreaks compared to the protective e↵ect of firebreaks on
crops and forest providing non timber forest products. The key hypothesis of this
model is that fire risk is exogenous to the household, and that thus there are no
externalities in the decision to allocate labor to clear firebreaks. The empirical
model consequent to this formalization show that the shadow wage of planting
labor, the price of manioc flour and the hunting activities are good predictor
of the engagement in fire prevention and of the labor allocated to firebreaks.
Moreover a likelihood ratio test provides evidence that household feature are far
less important than the economic variables. The hypothesis of exogenous fire
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risk is the most important limitation of both the theoretical and the empirical
models, indeed the perceived e↵ectiveness of the control also influence whether
individuals believe it is worth taking protective action or not (Slovic, 1987). Even
when farmers have an individual interest in controlling fire to avoid damage to
their own assets, they may not make this costly investment if there is a risk of fire
contagion from adjacent properties. Thus, assuming fire risk as an endogenous
variable, the choice of implementing fire control measures depends also on the
success of collective action at the local level (Cammelli and Coudel, 2013).
Few studies have investigated the externalities involved in fire control and
they mainly showed that agreement within a community regarding fire is rare, if
not inexistent (Carmenta et al., 2013; Mistry, 1998). Morello (2013) shows that
the externality exists and that high transaction costs impede Coasean bargain.
While the sample of Carmenta (2013) (n=156) shows that no single household
received compensations for the damages occurred, and that lack of fire control are
not perceived as any of the other hurting action demanding compensation, some
studies reported evidence of cooperation in traditional communities and more
recent settlements (Bowman et al., 2008; Brondizio and Moran, 2008; Toniolo,
2004), which may be explained by a di↵erence in agricultural practices and market
access but also by stricter social relations and organizational capacity in the
traditional communities.
Simmons et al. (2004) sought to identify the relationship between social
capital (defined as belonging to a political organization) and the occurrence of
fires. Carmenta et al. (2013) built an index of commitment toward the community
(a combination of birth in the community, migration, number of years lived in
the community and number of organizations) and linked it to the adoption of fire
control measures. Neither author found a significant correlation between the two
variables.
Why do they fail in determining social capital or collective action as fire control
predictors?
Possible problems relate to: proxies’ definition, mismatch between the level
of enquiry and the level of collective action, wrong definition of the mechanisms
operating, and understanding of institution involved.
Defining, observing and measuring social capital and collective action is always
challenging, both studies refer to the same seminal strand of literature on social
capital and role of communities: Agrawal and Gibson (1999); Dasgupta and
Serageldin (2000); Ostrom et al. (1993) considering it as providing su cient
incentives to set fire control measures. However there is no clear explanation of
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why belonging to a political organization should relates to the social capital evoked
in this strand of literature. Social capital, social control and collective action may
operate at di↵erent spatial and organizational scale (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004):
at the neighbors level, community level, municipality or even higher level; or to
di↵erent organizational level: member of a believer community, an association
etc. Moreover for any definition and every level of analysis social capital may
a↵ect incentives to set fire control measures through possible alternatives channels.
Those issues, as in many other studies on collective action (Ishihara and Pascual,
2009), have not been explored in any of the two studies. For this reason the two
works can’t be considered to bring conclusive evidence against social capital as a
determinant of fire control.
1.4. Statement of purpose
In this study we support the thesis that fire risk is, to some degree, endogenous to
the community or to the neighborhood. Fire control produce a positive externality
(in terms of reduced risk), understanding the fire control choice need to take
into account not only direct costs and cultural appropriateness but also the
interdependency that arise in fire management, and the implication for collective
action at the local level. We define collective action as the cooperation process
to provide a norm for fire control: a public good. The direct output of collective
action (the norm) is not observable, but the outcome, setting fire control measure,
can be observed and measured. Trust and social capital are the main indicator
that a collective action process is occurring.
Besides assessing the relative importance of collective action as a predictor of
fire prone behaviour (Chapter 4), we aim explaining why and how this mechanism
operates (Chapter 3, 5), and to provide useful information to improve national
and local policies addressing fires and forest conservation.
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Chapter 2
A mixed method approach to
study collective action
2.1. Introduction
Studying collective action is challenging because of specific di culties related
to the definition of the phenomenon, the unit of analysis (Poteete and Ostrom,
2004), the number of variables involved (Agrawal, 2001) and the di culties to
isolate and define causal relationships (Gibson et al., 2005; Ostrom, 2010). Indeed
a coherent theory linking all structural variables a↵ecting collective action has
not been designed yet (Ostrom, 2010). Collective action has a lot to do with
uncertainty and beliefs (Ostrom, 2000a), and an analysis of collective action needs
to take these dimensions into account. The main justification of this Chapter is
that the usual positivistic approach used in economics and the related methods
have proven insu cient in studying collective action (Poteete et al., 2010), and a
new approach is needed. We chose to start a reflection in this direction adopting
a triangulation methodology and designing a framework to discuss the choice of a
methodology consistent with the goals of this study.
This methodological framework is largely inspired by a realist and pragmatic
methodological approach in the sense of Bromley (2008): seeking reasons, and
not justifications to the behavior of actors. Human beings are immerged in an
uncertain reality and somehow undetermined future (Hardin, 2003), where they
are not just seeking an optimal choice since the set of choices is not already
given. They are probably seeking beliefs in order to act on a reasonable base, they
are probably asking: “what to do? and, why?”. Individuals do not answer this
question in solitude, but within their epistemic and hermeneutic communities and
traditions (Hodgson, 2007a, b). For this reason a lot of attention is given to the
17
institutional and relational context which leads to the definition of the situation.
The analysis will seek motivations and not preferences. While the revealed
preference theory assume consistency between action and preferences (Sen, 1977;
Vatn, 2005), analysing motivations of actions (instead of just reducing choices to
an utility maximization problem) account for the commitment problem to be an
object of study rather than an assumption.
Motivations are not a property of objects or events, but pertain to statements
on objects or events. The decision of what is true or not is a collaborative and
evolutionary matter (Bromley, 2008; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). This
ontological stance constrains upon the use of an only method (out of positivism,
that assume an objective reality and its cognoscibility by one only scientific
method), imposing a pluralism of methods. This multiple method approach
is inspired by Downward and Mearman (2007) mixed-method triangulation as
a manifestation of retroduction1 in economic research. An alternative to mere
deductive or inductive reasoning is to overcome the use of a method in a disciplinary
sense and to mix qualitative and quantitative approaches.
A review of collective action theory provides the starting point to reflect on the
relevance of new questions relating to collective action, and to the need for new
tools. The methodological choice of mixed method triangulation takes into account
the need for both qualitative data and statistical analysis. An epistemological
ground to ensure methodological coherence is provided. Finally a methodological
framework is drawn to show that triangulation is consistent with the objective of
this work to study collective action with both positive and normative purposes.
2.2. The study of an interdependent choice
2.2.1. The conventional paradigm
The conventional paradigm of collective action is made up of three reinforcing
theories, all based on rational choice analysis: Hardin’s tragedy of the commons,
the prisoner dilemma (and other game theory models), and social dilemmas
(Poteete et al., 2010).
For Hardin (1982:95) the tragedy of the commons (rival but not excludable
goods)is inevitable since:
‘Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his
1 ‘Mode of inference in which events are explained by postulating (and identifying) mechanisms
which are capable of producing them’ (Sayer, 1992:107 apud Downward and Mearman 2007).
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herd without limit in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination
toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a
society that believes in the freedom of the commons’.
This pessimistic view is consistent with the outcome of the Prisoner Dilemma
and other non cooperative games in which an ine cient Nash equilibrium is
often preferred to a more e cient cooperative equilibrium. Following this theory,
cooperation is rarely achieved because it involves a social dilemma in which
maximizing short run individual benefit leads to an ine cient suboptimal outcome
(Lichbach, 1996; Schelling, 1978). Even in repeated game, by backward induction
the final outcome is always zero cooperation (Luce and Rai↵a, 1957). Olson
(1965) supports three main determinants of collective action: group size, selective
incentives and heterogeneity of intents. Self organized groups do not provide
su cient individual benefits to incentivize agents to produce a public or common
good: in absence of an “entrepreneur” particularly interested in producing the
public good and setting selective incentives, individuals will free ride, failing to
achieve cooperation.
These theories are self-reinforcing and up to the 80’s were not questioned.
Poteete et al. (2010) state that they are theories of ‘collective inaction’ rather
than theories of collective action, as they fail in explaining the variance between
groups successfully managing a common or producing a public good. In fact in
successive years, case studies started reporting successful cases observed in many
region of the world, and experimental research found unexpectedly high levels of
cooperation (Poteete et al., 2010). This led to a refinement of traditional theory.
Clark (2006) enlightens how theories belonging to the conventional paradigm
rely on strong assumptions relating to actor characterization and the definition
of the situation. Actors are homogeneous, have complete information about the
environment and act independently one of each other as if they were maximizing
their short run self-interest. The assumption of complete information especially
contrasts with the structural uncertainty that characterizes the interaction be-
tween human and ecological system (Brondizio and Moran, 2008). A better
characterization of agency and the understanding of the role of institutions is key
in this respect (Bromley, 2006; Vatn, 2005). Many authors noticed how modify-
ing standard assumptions could bring about many opportunities for successful
collective action to occur (Poteete et al., 2010).
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2.2.2. The new story and the new problems
Taking seriously these critiques, research since the 90’s started considering standard
game theory as too restrictive (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al, 1992b) and taking
advantages of evolutionary approaches; new tools were developed in this field
such as laboratory experiments and more recently agent based modelling (for a
complete review see Poteete et al. (2010)).
Empirical research in the field improved in quality and quantity (Ostrom,
2010), but new problems emerged. A number of small-n case studies evidenced
new important variables, and thanks to the common IFRI protocol, su cient
data were collected to operate large-n analyses (Gibson et al., 2005; Poteete and
Ostrom, 2004).
The backdrop of this new empirical approach is that the array of factors
influencing collective action skyrocketed, making it increasingly challenging to
study this phenomenon, especially in complex social-ecological system (Ostrom,
2009). A review of variables found a “restraint” set of 33 variables having
such an important potential influence over collective action likelihood, that any
rigorous study could not omit them without adequate explanations (Agrawal,
2001). Controlling for all these variables leads to complicated data collection,
research design and consume degrees of freedom. Moreover there is no agreement
over the definition of variables: which is the appropriate unit of analysis, when
the unit of analysis is acting collectively or not, for which purpose may it act
collectively, what does a↵ect or definitely does not a↵ect collective action (Poteete
and Ostrom, 2004). Indeed estimating a structural model of collective action is
rather challenging because of selection bias, omitted variable bias and frequently
missing observations (Gibson et al., 2005). Moreover since more and more evidence
is showing how cooperation and trust are the result of feedback process produced
in iterated interaction, independence among variables cannot be considered as a
reliable assumption (Poteete et al., 2010) and endogeneity bias is likely to occur
(Beckmann and Padmanabhan, 2009). As a partial solution, Agrawal (2001)
suggests to focus on causal mechanisms, narrow chains, and not to look at all
potential variables.
While empirical research is becoming more and more challenging, theoretical
research is stagnating. No clear theory links the whole ‘spaghetti plate’ of variables
a↵ecting collective action. The real challenge of present collective action research
is to link the structural variables a↵ecting collective action to the core trust-
reciprocity-cooperation relationship (Ostrom, 2007, 2010) (Figure 2.1).
In the end, as many argue, research on collective action is likely to be biased
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Figure 2.1: The core relationship explaining collective action
Source: Ostrom (2007, p. 202).
toward the cases in which collective action is occurring and is somehow measurable
(Ostrom, 2010), lagging behind the explanation of why collective action may not
occur, and which stimulus may improve its likelihood. This occur because the
new approach to collective action theory has been developed in opposition to the
conventional theory of “collective inaction” and because few or no tools have been
developed to analyse cases in which collective action is not directly observable,
where collective action is not occurring or a reciprocity norm is not observable yet.
Thus a further challenge is how to turn current knowledge on collective action in
fields in which collective action is not directly observable, turning eventually to
normative analysis to improve governance.
2.2.3. Implication for this study
The goal of this work, rather than focusing on what determines collective action,
is to study if collective action is an important issue in fire control (positive,
quantitative analysis), why, and how institutions may improve governance for
collective action (normative, qualitative analysis). In this sense we need an
operational definition of collective action and an appropriate methodological
ground.
We will use a mixed method triangulation for the triple purpose of overcoming
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some of the aforementioned di culties in studying collective action, to cross-check
findings and improve their persuasiveness, and to enrich the analysis with di↵erent
viewpoints.
However, as we discuss hereinafter, crossing di↵erent methods in a consistent
way is not an easy task and implies a common epistemological ground (Johnson
and Onwuegbuzie, 2004).
2.3. The methodological choice of triangulation
and the consequences for studying collec-
tive action
2.3.1. Critical realism: the epistemological bases of trian-
gulation in economic research
Both intensive and extensive methods have strength and weaknesses, and often
rely on di↵erent assumptions. Following Downward and Mearman (2007), we
discuss the opportunity and the implication of a mixed method triangulation
approach.
Methods are defined within ontological assumptions that are key in defining
interpretation, consistency and possibilities of generalization of results. This is the
field in which theories often confront each other and evolve, and that often oppose
economics to other social sciences. The blind (positivist) reliance on inductive
methods versus an extreme relativism of qualitative field data (interactionism), is
the main example of the chiasm separating economists and anthropologists. The
debate comes from the existence or not of value free observations and measurement
of a phenomenon.
Pragmatic reasons ask for bridging qualitative and quantitative methods,
however on contrasting ontological bases there is no possible triangulation, since
both approaches refuse each other.
Positivist ontology leads to over rely on inductive reasoning, failing because
at least decision criteria to build empirical tests are value judgments themselves
(Popper, 1959). By opposite the main problem of a deductive or hypothetic-
deductive approach is that premises fully entail conclusions. For this to be true
the world should be a close system in which single causes can be isolated. In
Lawson’s (1997, 2003) view this is just a conflation of the object of the analysis,
what he calls “epistemic fallacy”.
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Instrumentalism, i.e. evaluating models by the predictive capacity instead,
but not for the accuracy of the world description commits epistemic fallacy
as well: the phenomena under observation is confused with a set of ideas of
the observer (Lawson, 1988). Le Moigne’s (1995) constructivism holds against
positivist and realist ontological hypothesis of an objective reality, that can be
known “asymptotical” by a procedural construction of knowledge, in which the
procedure of inference incurs in the problem already defined above i.e. it is not
neutral, but dependent on the choice of criteria. According to the constructivist
approach the nature of knowledge is a construction, made up by the interaction
between phenomena and the observer and the goals of the observer.
Critical realists distinguish themselves from na¨ıve realists criticized by construc-
tivism in the sense that, despite assuming an intransitive dimension of knowledge
independent of our understanding of the world (i.e. an objective reality), knowl-
edge is expressed and informed by subjectivity. Critical realism acknowledges the
fallibility of knowledge (Lawson, 2003; Sayer, 2000). Actually, it is because of this
fallibility that mixed method triangulation and retroduction are needed to define
the causes of a phenomenon (Downward and Mearman, 2007).
2.3.2. The three component of a cause
According to Downward and Mearman (2007):
‘The concept of cause in critical realism is tied to the emergence from
the interaction of human agency and institutions or structures. In
thisregard, the motivational (or otherwise) dimension of agency needs
to be elaborated, as well as the mechanisms that facilitate action, or
behaviour, coupled with the relational context of that behaviour.’
Bromley (2006, 2008) insists on the importance to redefine in economics what a
cause is, since the traditional inductive method of utility maximization given a set
of hypothesis does not provide an explanation itself. Asking: “why?” the answer
can’t be “to maximize my utility”. In Schumpeter’s (1961: 4) view:
‘we succeed in finding a definite causal relation between two phenomena
[. . . ] if the one which play the ‘causal’ role is non economic’.
Abduction (or retroduction) allows to come back to the real set of causes. There
are no cognizable covering laws applied to reality, because we assume that society
is an open system in which time and space exist (Lawson, 2003).
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Both critical realists and pragmatists recognize the fallibility of knowledge
due respectively, to an intransitive component of knowledge (Lawson, 2003),
or to structural uncertainty (Bromley, 2008; McDermid, 2006), leading to the
indeterminacy problem in social sciences (Hardin, 2003). Both schools of thought
point out that the knowledge of reality is mediated by beliefs and subjectivity,
and thus they must be taken into account in the analysis. Actor reasons are part
of the notion of cause as well; in the words of Bromley (2008):
‘Indeterminacy is the reason we reason. [. . . ] Pragmatism understands
human choice as a process of imagining plausible outcomes in the
future under several possible descriptions’.
Addressing the ‘why’ question, we cannot ignore any of the constituent elements
of the notion of ‘cause’: motivations and beliefs to operate a choice and which
lead to a certain definition of the situation, the institutional and the relational
structure which enable or constraint action.
2.3.3. Triangulation and collective action: a summary frame-
work to analyse collective action as a potential so-
lution
A common ontological ground for a mixed method is needed to define the role of
each method (with respect to the notion of cause), how to interpret results and
how results from a single method support (or not) each other. Here we present
the three methods used in this research (semi-structured interviews, econometrics
and Q methodology), and we discuss how to interpret results avoiding epistemic
fallacy, that is a conflation of the subject and object of research invoking covering
laws.
In Chapter 3 the result of a qualitative case study explores individual moti-
vations and institutional factors possibly a↵ecting collective action. Results are
highly dependent on the capacity to collect and to analyze data. They partly
reflect the interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee. They reflect
essentially the facts relating to the persons included in the sample. However by
triangulation and saturation some of the results are more apt to be generalized.
Indeed statistical inference is not the only way to provide generalization. Retro-
duction provides the base to generalize through triangulation. Retroduction takes
place by crossing results from the empirical qualitative enquiry and the results
of other methods. Crossing case study and large-n methods avoids conflating of
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object and subject of research by individuating the results from direct observa-
tions that are strongly mediated by interaction. Moreover the results from the
econometric model can be explained assuming true propositions based on direct
observations. In the end some degrees of interaction between the interviewer and
the interviewee operate even collecting quantitative data. Thus statistical results
even when reflecting causal mechanisms cannot supply clear-cut results.
Triangulation within the case study allows establishing validity of qualitative
propositions (Yin, 2009). This case study provides information to overcome
several di culties addressed in Chapter 3 related to the study of collective action.
Qualitative data allows formulating grounded hypothesis about the level, the unit
of analysis and the main variables involved in collective action, to formulate the
right heuristics to think about the fire control problem and to define proxies.
In Chapter 4 a theoretical model is drawn and econometric models are es-
timated. The results of the statistical models do not validate nor invalidate
the theoretical model built from a deductive process. Any causal mechanism
has the same a priori probability to be true or false. Testing prediction via an
econometric model commits epistemic fallacy since empirical connections do not
prove any active mechanism. Indeed since society is an open system, any latent
causal mechanism based on assumptions di↵erent from those of the conjectured
theoretical model may operate in the statistical model with the same or with
opposite signs (Downward and Mearman, 2002).
We must take extreme care in defining meaningful proxies, and consider that
there is no direct connection between the ideas of the observer and the external
reality, thus variables may not reflect only the desired phenomena. Crossing
variables correlation and results from the qualitative enquiry exposed in Chapter
3 may support the choice for di↵erent proxies.
The aim of a theoretical model in this study is to provide an explanation for
the specification of the empirical model, the estimation procedure, and to provide
a hypothesis of stylized core mechanisms. Econometrics is not apt to test model
predictions; instead it is suitable to measure frequencies and correlations within a
sample (Downward and Mearman, 2002).
The econometric model seeks to identify the relevance of collective action with
respect to other variables within the sample. In doing that there are no inductive
claims nor excessive reliance on inference, nor any ambition of predictive capacity
(Downward and Mearman, 2002).
In Chapter 5 we takes into account for actor subjectivity. Every positivistic
assumption about the cause is finally removed. The quest for mental model add
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further details to the analysis, relaxing any assumption on causes and revealing
actors definition of the situation. In this it elicits the feedbacks between the
factors a↵ecting choices counted in the econometric model and the institutions
a↵ecting collective action described in the case study. Moreover by analyzing this
interaction it is possible to understand how institutional innovations and collective
action may arise and can be maintained (Braun and Gilardi, 2006; Matthews
and Selman, 2006), and in particular the e↵ects of di↵erent definitions of the
situation on beliefs. Q methodology allows studying actors subjectivity (Brown,
1980; Stephenson, 1935), and we sought to use it to elicit actors mental models.
A mixed methods approach disentangles the phenomena from many points
of view addressing all the constituent elements of the notion of cause, providing
ontic depth (i.e. robustness to ontological assumptions) and strengthening the
persuasiveness of findings in which it provides many di↵erent pillars supporting the
same hypothesis, increasing its verisimilitude (Downward and Mearman, 2007).
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Chapter 3
A qualitative enquiry: addressing
the role of local institutions
3.1. Introduction
In this Chapter we carry out a qualitative analysis of the reasons (in the sense
of Bromley (2008)) a↵ecting the willingness to engage in fire control or not, and
the role played by institutions in the formation of these reasons. By means of a
large set of semi-structured interviews we study the e↵ects of fire contagion and
its impact on production, the fire control and fire fight practices implemented
by farmers and their limits, the ambiguous influence of reciprocity and market
on the choice to set fire control measures and the role of community institutions.
We also report a success story about the Biennial Programme of Prevention and
Combat to Forest Fires of the municipality of Ipixuna do Para´.
3.2. Collective action, compliance and institu-
tions: a theoretical framework
In this part, we outline a theoretical framework based on collective action liter-
ature, adding some insights from compliance theory, neo institutional theory of
motivational and institutional crowding out and from geographical economics.
3.2.1. Modern theory of collective action.
Decades of theoretical and empirical research found several variables a↵ecting
behaviour in interdependent choices (Ostrom, 2010; Poteete et al., 2010; Poteete
and Ostrom, 2004). However there is no clear link between those structural
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variables and the core mechanism based on reciprocity, trust and cooperation
(Poteete et al., 2010). Causal mechanisms change according to the theoretical
assumptions underlying each theory. Theory is particularly sensitive to assump-
tions relating to degrees of perfect and complete information, uncertainty and
indeterminacy, bounded or perfect rationality and methodological individualism.
As already discussed in Chapter 2, empirical finding from experimental and non
experimental games provided evidence that assumptions about complete and
perfect information and of close social system are too strong to analyse collective
action dynamics, especially in the field of natural resource management (Ostrom,
2008; Ostrom, 2009). Indeed theoretical results based on those assumptions do
not explain collective action behaviour (Poteete et al., 2010).
To provide a full description of all the variables individuated empirically and
all the causal chains that have been hypothesized up to now would be a huge
task. The number of variables is high as well as the amount of literature that
addresses the related causal mechanisms. Di↵erences in research hypothesis and
tools often led to di↵erent conclusions about causal roles, individuating e↵ects of
contradicting sign. Heterogeneity, for instance, has been demonstrated to a↵ect
interdependent choices in di↵ering ways depending on assumptions about human
behaviour. Strands of literature di↵er with respect to the weights associated
to heterogeneity of framing, of endowments or of goals (Poteete and Ostrom,
2004). Heterogeneity of endowments and homogeneity of goals lead rational
individuals to cooperate, while homogeneity of framing is key for cooperation
under the assumption of norm driven behaviour (Lynam et al., 2012; Ostrom,
2000a; Stone-Jovicich et al., 2011). It is also remarkable that variables a↵ecting
collective action do not belong to mutually exclusive categories: for instance it
is hard to explain how social capital a↵ects transaction costs in a group without
overlapping issues related to heterogeneity drivers. Ostrom (1990) found several
design principles specially a↵ecting the likelihood of a norm to emerge:
• Presence of clear boundary rules within the group .
• Rules within the group are appropriate to the social technological and market
context.
• Most of the member a↵ected by the rules can participate in the decision
making process.
• Monitors of social norms are legitimated.
• Graduated sanctions existence, sanction ease and access to justice.
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• Exit strategies.
Based on a selected literature review (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001; Beckmann
and Padmanabhan, 2009; Gibson et al., 2005; Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 2000a, 2008;
Ostrom, 2009; Ostrom, 2010; Poteete and Ostrom, 2004) we present other variables
relating to group and resource features that seemed especially appropriate to
our purpose, and for which theoretical explanations appear more relevant to the
context.
• Group size: it is always significant in empirical analysis, but with ambiguous
sign. Cooperation in large groups may become less likely due to increasing
transaction costs and free riding problem, however a larger group is more
able to leverage external resources.
• Heterogeneity of participant (specifically addressed in Chapter 6), may
relates to mental models, endowments or goals. In our case mental models
may relates to experienced damages and perceptions of fire risk, endowment
refer to the e↵ective capacity to control fire, and goals may di↵er depending
on fire sensitiveness of the planted crops.
• Information about past actions increases the ability of monitoring and
sanctioning, increasing the e↵ect of reputation and increasing the survival
probability of cooperators.
• How individuals are linked as well as the face-to-face communication oppor-
tunities. The tightness of social capital that shape the interaction and the
power relations in a community, the level of institutionalization of groups
and norms, and the level of organization to reach common goals may reduce
transaction costs and increase trust. These issues seem to the author a
relevant issue in a context in which actors are spread-out in a large space.
• Monitoring and sanctioning activities are fundamental to reinforce norms
and reduce free riding, especially in a context poor of formal institutions as
the rural areas in the Brazilian Amazon.
• Leadership in the group increases the probability of innovation. It explains
the onset of new norms and provides the fundamental stimulus to undertake
collective action.
• A common knowledge of technology reduces conflicts in decision making by
reducing transaction costs, but it may create situations of lock in. Technol-
ogy hold and important role in fire control collective action, coordination
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or conflicts may arise depending on beliefs relating to fire use and the
e↵ectiveness of fire control techniques.
• The importance of the resource to the user increases commitment to collective
action since the expected benefits issue of cooperation increase.
• Size of the total collective benefit and marginal contribution by one person
to the collective good, both a↵ect the size of the temptation to free ride.
• Loss of co-operators when the others do not cooperate may increase commit-
ment to punishment, but depending on heterogeneity of goals may undermine
the likelihood of collective action.
No matter how collective action is framed, the commitment and sanctioning
dilemmas emerge as two useful heuristics (North, 1993; Ostrom, 1990, 1992). The
latter relates to the ex post punishment of co-operators toward free riders, while
the first relates to the ability of actors to credibly commit to implement a set
of actions (Shepsle, 1991). Commitment is equally important to sanctioning in
determining collective action success since it contributes to the formation of the
agent’s expectations. The commitment dilemma is especially relevant when little
sanctioning exists and when uncertainty about the collective action outcome is
high (Ostrom, 1990).
Commitment and sanctioning lead to at least two levels of social dilemmas:
the first relates to the choice of participating or not in cooperation, to conform
or deviate from the norm, and sanction or not free riders. The second level
social dilemma relates to the change of rules, and the creation of a norm allowing
sanctioning free riders, legitimating and giving su cient incentives to sanctioners.
Creating and changing norms and rules is a collective action dilemma since norms
and rules are public goods (Ostrom, 2000a). In our case collective action to create
a norm for fire control is a second level collective action dilemma.
3.2.2. Compliance, institutions and geographical economics
We wish to take into account in our framework some other variables that are usually
not included in studies on collective action, but that are useful to understand
the interaction among institutions, policies and collective action likelihood. In
particular we refer to motivational and institutional crowding out e↵ects (Cardenas
et al., 2000; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Ostrom, 2000b), compliance motivations to the
law (Gezelius and Hauck, 2011; Winter and Fried, 2000; Winter and May, 2001),
and the concepts of proximities (Torre and Rallet, 2005).
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Participation in collective action depends on whether actors believe that a
cooperative success may take place but also that it is their role to contribute to
the collective action success (Ostrom, 2000a). This is essential for both single
actors and institutions involved in the cooperative game. Farmers, for instance
may frame risk as something natural and inescapable or as a risk that can be
mitigated, and in this case, whether it is a private or governmental task to take
action to mitigate risk. Policy intervention may reinforce motivations to cooperate
and improve collective action likelihood, but it may also crowd out motivations
and institutions oriented to fire control.
‘Institutional crowding-out suggests that well-intentioned but modestly
enforced government controls of local environmental quality and natu-
ral resource use may perform rather poorly, especially as compared to
informal local management.’ (Cardenas et al., 2000).
Frey and Jegen (1999) define the conditions for motivational crowding in and
crowing out:
‘External interventions crowd out intrinsic motivation if the individuals
a↵ected perceive them to be controlling. In that case, both self-
determination and self-esteem su↵er, and the individuals react by
reducing their intrinsic motivation in the activity controlled. External
interventions crowd in intrinsic motivation if the individuals concerned
perceive it as supportive. In that case, self-esteem is fostered, and
the individuals feel that they are given more freedom to act, which
enlarges self-determination’.
This happens because of changes in preferences and in perceptions about the
environment, tasks and self. Policies and norms may have important crowding
out or crowding in e↵ects on collective action success especially on the second
level dilemma for norm creation and sanctioners legitimation. Crowding in and
crowding out impact of policies and norms must be taken into account analysing
an interdependent choice.
Since fire control is mandatory by law, compliance motivations also enter in
fire control choice. Law in this case, even if very poorly enforced may support
coordination and crowd in motivations to participate in fire control. Winter and
May (2001) show empirically that compliance with environmental regulation does
not depends only on the cost of compliance, likelihood of detection and likelihood
of fine as in Sutinen and Kuperan (1999). Compliance, instead, depends greatly
on perception of compliance as a moral duty, enforcement style, awareness of
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rules and e↵ective capacity to comply. Gezelius and Hauck (2011) stress that
three distinct mechanisms operate: a deterrence one depending on enforcement
intensity; a moral support for law content one, depending on empowerment of
citizens, and a legislator’s authority one, a function of civic identity. Moreover it is
shown that the relative importance of those mechanisms in explaining compliance
to the law varies across countries with the embeddedness of state in society, and
across sectors.
Collective action and fire hazard may take place at di↵erent scales, and the
level at which collective action can emerge may not be the most e cient to
mitigate fire risk. This potential mismatch can a↵ect the likelihood of collective
action. Following Torre and Rallet (2005) we distinguish between organized and
geographical proximities. The latter emerge from the reduced distance among
actors and have often been confused with organizational proximities. The former
are made up by institutions, norms and organizations that allow to cooperate
or bargain to overcome tensions and conflicts. Geographical proximities can be
sources of conflicts related to consumption of resources, and may not overlap
with organizational proximities. In our case geographical proximities are sources
of conflicts because fire contagion takes place first of all in the neighborhood of
ignition sources. On the other side organizational proximities may operate at an
excessively high or excessively low scale. In the first case transaction costs are too
high, in the second case coordination costs are too high.
Summarizing, we discussed here all the heuristics we used to collect data and
interpret results of interviews. Collective action depends on a key trust-reciprocity-
cooperation loop. Several variables related to group and resource features a↵ect
this loop; moreover the formation of trust and reciprocity relates to di↵erent levels
of collective action dilemmas, involving both the dimensions of sanctioning and
commitment (Figure 2.1). Institutions may play an important role in explaining
cooperation and can be analysed with normative intent to define how they can
provide incentives to improve collective action likelihood. For this purpose we
introduce the concepts of institutional crowding out, crowding in and compliance
motivations, and we distinguish between organized and geographical proximities.
Figure 3.1 report geographical proximities on the x-axis and organized proximities
on the y-axis. Small rectangles refers to neighborhoods in which collective action for
fire control may take place. At the community level local institutions may provide
coordination either between neighborhoods either with higher level institutions.
At the municipal scale policies a↵ect compliance motivations to the law and may
crowd-in or out institutions and motivations for fire control.
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Figure 3.1: Theoretical framework
3.3. Goals: methods and data
3.3.1. Methodology
We conducted a two-month field study in the municipalities of Ipixuna do Para´
and Paragominas. These two municipalities are located in the so-called ”arc of
deforestation” in the north-east of Para`.
We carried out 60 semi-structured interviews in 15 heterogeneous communi-
ties. The interviews were conducted with key stakeholders, identified thanks to
information provided by the community leaders and local organizations. The
profile of the key stakeholder is extremely variable, from farmers behaving in
a particularly innovative or entrepreneurial way to farmers who have su↵ered
serious injury from fire contagion or who have implemented novel approaches
to control fires, to farmers fulfilling an important role in the organization of
the community. The number of interviews in each community depended on the
degree of complexity met. Interviews were aimed at understanding the collective
action dynamics in each relevant group with respect to fire issue. Many times
the community was not the right level to study collective action: neighboring
relations and informal groups seems to cover an important role (Agrawal, 2001).
As remarked in other case studies on collective action, communities and groups
have very di↵erent features and cannot be grouped under a unique definition
(Beckmann and Padmanabhan, 2009; Gibson et al., 2005; Poteete and Ostrom,
2004). The only operational criterion we used to define groups is the organized
and/or geographical proximity with respect to the fire issue. Those criteria were
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verified with maps, observation and introductory conversation with leaders of
communities or of local organizations.
Interviews were also conducted with o cers of local and country institutions
including the o cers of PrevFogo, o cers from EMATER and EMBRAPA1 of
Paragominas, the Secretary of Environment and the Secretary of Agriculture of
both Paragominas and Ipixuna do Para`. These interviews aimed to understand
how government o cers perceived the fire issue, and how they implemented related
policies.
All relevant data collected in the interviews were then triangulated with
data from other key stakeholders within the same group and at least one farmer
randomly chosen within each group or community. In some cases, the information
was discussed in a meeting with the group.
Information was then organized in a database by community or by group.
Appendix A provides the list of questions used in interviews.
3.3.2. The context of the study: Pargominas and Ipixuna
do Para`
Our study explores how smallholders’ perceptions of fire risk may influence fire
use and control. Previous works showed that fire risk and the preventive measures
to control it vary according to the type of landscape (open pasture, forest)
(Nepstad et al., 1999) or to the type of social norms (traditional communities,
recent settlements) (Brondizio and Moran, 2008). We also assume they may vary
according to the type of policies that address the fire problem. We consequently
selected a variety of communities in two neighboring municipalities, Paragominas
and Ipixuna do Para´, both located in the post-frontier region of Para´ state (Figure
Paragominas
The municipality of Paragominas was chosen as it is usually considered a case
of success of sustainable management policy, and holds a wide range of di↵erent
communities.
The first colonization in the region started in the thirties by ribeirinhos
farmers (Uhl and Almeida, 1996). Paragominas was settled at the end of the
fifties, experiencing three productive cycles up to now. The true colonization
started in the fifties opening the region to cattle breeding, strongly incentivized
by the government (at that time mainly concerned by cattle export increase to
1 The organizations respectively charged of technical assistance and research for agriculture.
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Figure 3.2: Identification of the communities visited for the study
Source: Cammelli et al. (2014)
restore the balance of payments equilibrium). Cattle breeding continued being the
main economic activity until logging started to take place on a large scale in the
eighties, overtaking cattle breeding. At the end of the nineties Paragominas was
responsible for 20% of the wood production of the Para` state. At the beginning
of the new century a new intensive soy wave started taking place. In 2010 the
municipality was the first soy producer of Para´ (Coudel et al., 2012; Gardner et
al., 2013).
In 2008 Paragominas was hit by the “Arco de Fogo” (Arc of Fire) opera-
tion as it was included in the 36 municipalities black listed by the Ministry of
the Environment because of illegal deforestation. Violent demonstrations rose
hammering away the federal police and the IBAMA agents that were enforcing
illegal sawmills and firms closure. In 2010 Paragominas exited the black list
and in the Brazilian media was referred to as the example to be followed for
sustainable management in the Amazon. A zero deforestation pact was signed
among municipal private and public institutions, and the new Municipio Verde
(Green Municipality) management model was adopted (Barreto and Araujo, 2012).
The Municipal environmental code (law 765/2011) banned any sort of fire, but for
smallholders the stick was not followed by any carrot: in fact they experienced
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the destruction of carbon ovens, sequestration of chainsaws and other assets, but
they didn’t received any incentive to move toward sustainable farming. The last
two mayors of the town were big landholders and the main focus of municipal
policies has been the development of highly mechanized soy and beef production:
agronegocio.
The majority of our field research was carried out in three areas of this mu-
nicipality: the first area (Capim region) is characterized by the most conserved
environment and is populated by ancient traditional riverside populations (ribeir-
inhos). The other two are land reform settlements; one dominated by degraded
landscape and pastures (Paragonorte), while the other still conserves some forest
cover (Luiz Inacio) (Figure ??).
The traditional communities were founded in the early 1950s by ribeirinhos
and were structured following the establishment of Catholic church units in the
region. Livelihoods are mainly based on extractive activities, including “roc¸a”
and forest resources. They are relatively small communities, with a population
ranging between 10 and 50 families per community.
The land reform settlements we visited were created by the INCRA (National
Institute of Colonization and Land Reform) in the late 1990s on large properties
(Fazendas) that were abandoned after cattle and timber activities declined. Two
of them are amongst the largest land settlements in Latin America, with more
than 1000 families, organized in communities that usually comprise more than
200 families. The settlers are mainly from the Para´ state although they may come
from other parts of the country, and their livelihoods mainly depend on crops and
cattle.
Today Paragominas accounts for a surface of 19.309,9 km2 and 97.788 inhabi-
tants, and only 21,78% of total population lives in rural area (IBGE 2010). In
2009 family agriculture accounted for 159.600 hectares, i.e. the 8,2% of the land in
the municipality (Pinto et al., 2009). The main crops are rice, beans, manioc and
corn (Pinto et al., 2009); pastures are widespread as well. Perennial crops are rare,
Pinto et al. (2009) Toniolo and Uhl (1995) Almeida and Uhl (1995) individuated
rubber trees, oranges, cocoa, mango, passion fruit, black pepper, cashew nuts and
bananas.
Ipixuna do Para`
Ipixuna is a small municipality of 51.393 inhabitants over a 5.216,948 km2 territory
(IBGE 2010) born at the border of Paragominas in 1991. Interviews concentrated
in the Gleba 13 area (Figure ??). It has been included in the research during the
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field study because farmers interviewed at the border of Paragominas praised the
municipal policies for smallholders in Ipixuna, also with respect to the fire issue.
Ipixuna do Para` can be distinguished from Paragominas because of the prevalence
of family agriculture, with 76% of the population living in rural communities
and a much lower land concentration (Amaral et al., 2011; Pinto et al., 2009).
Ipixuna is not as interesting as Paragominas from an historical point of view, but
it developed interesting policies addressing various problems of family agriculture,
among which a special program to control fire. Another interesting feature is that
Ipixuna didn’t enter the Arco de Fogo black list, and seems more compliant with
the law (Guimara˜es et al., 2011), keeping the average annual deforestation rate
between 2006 and 2011 under the legal threshold of 40km2/year (Amaral et al.,
2011).
3.4. Results
Five main issues have been identified from the analysis of information collected:
we first expose the impact of fire contagion on the properties and communities
and its impact on production. In the following we discus the measures of fire
control and fire fighting implemented by farmers individually and within groups
defined by geographical or organizational proximity (Torre and Rallet, 2005), and
their main limitations (di culty in commitment, monitoring and sanctioning).
In a third part we will discuss the factors a↵ecting the adoption of fire control
measures, especially reciprocity and market access. Finally, we will assess farmers’
perceptions about the role of community and the public action in preventing fires,
and the Biennial Programm of Prevention and Combat to Forest Fires of the
municipality of Ipixuna do Para´.
3.4.1. E↵ects of fire contagion and its impact on produc-
tion
All the people interviewed have su↵ered damages caused by fire, and no one
has been able to point to someone who has remained untouched. However, the
intensity of the damages are heterogeneous: while some farmers have not su↵ered
from fires for 6-7 years, some others have su↵ered damages up to 3 consecutive
years.
Some crops require limited use of fire, as perennial crops, but the latter are
an investment that takes time to reach maturity and thus are very susceptible to
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fire. When asked about why it is so rare to observe perennial crops Seu Zaquinha
answers:
‘Suppose I plant fruit trees here, the fire comes and burns everything,
what do I do then? What will I be doing here? (indicating the other
farms) [. . . ] But if the fire stopped coming, then I would plant ac¸ai,
cashew, mango, bacaba, and all I would need! But will I clean an
area, plant trees and fertilize them knowing that fire will come and
kill everything?’
The major damages caused by accidental fires concern perennial crops, pastures
and fences. In case of absence of subsidies for cattle breeding fires push farmers to
produce almost exclusively annual crops as a strategy to mitigate fire risk (Figure
3.3).
Figure 3.3: Burnt perennial crops victim of fire contagion from the adjacent plot
are substituted with manioc crop
However, it happens that even annual crops are damaged by fires, in which
case the family lives from extractivism and day labor:
‘Those loosing even their roc¸a can sell some days of work, fish, hunt
or collect ac¸ai. . . Nature is benevolent!’ ( Seu Adalto )
38
Despite experiencing huge damages from fire, there is a clear preference for slash
and burn, especially among those who have experienced alternative techniques,
such as slash and mulch or the use of the tractors. The latter in particular requires
high initial investments, especially in fertilizers and herbicides, thus implying a
strong market orientation and undertaking a higher economic risk. The high level
of entrepreneurship necessary to withstand such economic risk has been observed
very rarely. By opposite government subsidies for additional inputs are highly
demanded. When a tractor is used, complementary fertilizers or herbicides are
very rarely used.
Given the prevalent use of fire, the limited alternatives available and the occur-
rence of fire accidents, fire control and firefight takes on considerable importance.
3.4.2. Fire control, firefight and its limits
The first level at which collective action emerges is the neighborhood. It is actually
in the neighborhood that most daily communications takes place, trust or conflicts
arise, help and day work are exchanged and fire control measures are set.
In the neighborhood both explicit and implicit agreements are taken about
production, e.g. sharing a pasture, and about the preventive measures to be
implemented against fires. Discussions reported in interviews include firebreaks
that divide two properties, the notification of the date and time in which the
burn will take place, or even the decision to burn together two adjacent areas.
The neighborhood is thus the ”natural” milieu within which these decisions
are taken. The geographical proximity, in fact, is a key factor in generating
the interdependence at the origin of the fire control dilemma. However, these
geographical proximities do not always correspond to the organized proximities in
which farmers can mitigate risk. A first barrier to the circulation of information
and the formation of trust and reciprocity is the lack of communication due to the
physical distance between various properties, or the absenteeism of the owners,
who may live several kilometres away, in other communities, or have migrated
elsewhere, leaving the properties under management to a member of the family or
to a trusted person. In addition, an empty property can be dangerous because
less labor force is available to deal with an eventual fire in that area, and the
probability of identifying the culprit and ability to control the behaviour of an
illegal occupier are reduced.
Besides the lack of a responsible for each plot of land, there are other elements
arising from the interaction with complex natural systems disturbing the emergence
of risk prone behaviours.
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Multiple possible ignition sources and variability of weather conditions disturb
the perceptions of risk by producers, who are sometimes unable to explain the
occurrence of fires and related incidents, or yet the e↵ectiveness or ine↵ectiveness
of the set of fire control measures implemented. This leads to blaming unlikely
cigarette butts, badly extinguished cooking fires, arsonist or children who set
fire for fun, instead of taking preventive measures in slash and burn activities
and renewal of pastures with fire. In other cases, the climatic conditions and the
inattentiveness of other farmers increase the incertitude around the occurrence
and intensity of a fire event, inducing to judge it impossible to be controlled, and
to consider fires as a normal occurrence.
Problems related to uncertainty of ignition sources are reduced in areas with
extensive moist forest cover, but are high or very high in areas of degraded forest
or pastures. Where the forest is still damp and unlikely to be flammable, to build
firebreaks takes a few days, the removal of some trees and the creation of half
a meter width footpaths free of dry leaves is usually implemented without huge
deploy of resources. Moreover, even without building firebreaks it is possible to
expect a low probability of propagation or contagion.
By opposite, in areas of degraded forests or pastures the risk of fire is much
higher and building barriers to propagation is more expensive. Interviewed farmers
often show fear of fire, astonished by the ease of spread of fire in the forest, or
by the height and the heat of the flames in the pastures that easily bypass even
tracks and roads. The only precautions in these cases relate to pasture fences and
houses, where fire is easier to be controlled.
Various farmers complain that despite the e↵ort to control fires locally, there
is always the threat of ‘fogo de longe’, the fire that comes from afar due to a fail
in fire control in another neighborhood, even belonging to the same community.
Therefore, even if there is su cient agreement about fire control in a neighborhood,
the benefits derived from reducing risk locally may be annulled by the failure
of collective action among producers who live a few miles away, especially in
degraded areas. Every 3-5 years, in particularly dry summers aggravated by the
El Nin˜o event, many farmers experience fires of great extension that can last up
to three months, starting with the season of fires and exhausting only with the
onset of the rain season.
The randomness of the fire hazard and the climate alea produce a high level of
uncertainty about the success of collective action. Increasingly fires are perceived
as a natural and uncontrollable phenomenon, therefore reducing incentives to
cooperate for fire control.
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Together with uncertainty, the problem of enforcement of the rules appears
to be the main barrier to the solution of the collective action dilemma: if it is
relatively easy to discover the source of a fire and the ignition source, it is di cult
to find out who is the culprit of the contagion. Except for the abandoned lots,
each property corresponds to an owner. Lot abandonment is increasingly frequent
in reason of the distance to the market and the low quality of land, especially in
land reform settlements. Since farmers set fires on di↵erent days, investigations
can easily identify the plot source of contagion. Nevertheless the landowner can
always exonerate himself by accusing unknowns to have lit a fire on his property.
Moreover, the search for the culprit is discouraged by the di culty in obtaining
compensations: farmers do not have money to pay for the damages they may cause,
and this reduces the incentives to start a discussion that would lead to antagonize
the neighbor and a part of the community with him. In various communities
interviewed farmers expressed fear of making complaints or seeking compensation
for fire damages with the terms: ‘afraid to be a shot? (medo de um tiro) or ‘look
goofy [in front of the community]’ (ficar tolo).
‘The neighbor is wrong, but if we go complaining he will get angry
with us, and we may fight. So if we are damaged by fire, the best is to
remain silent.’ ( Seu Valgico )
The inability to sanction and implement credible threats against free riders leads
to the commitment dilemma: why spend time in taking preventive measures if
there is no guarantee that others will do the same?
We frequently observed prevailing annual crops, few perennial crops and poor
infrastructure, associated with lack of investments in fire control. A low level
equilibrium, in which adaptation to a high frequency of fire contagion takes place
by reducing the value of crops at stake, planting the less fire sensitive crops
(essential for subsistance livelihoods and resilience but less valued on the market),
and reducing productive investments.
If collective action to set fire control measures may have too high costs, we
observed a higher level of cooperation in fire fighting activities.
Although collective action to set preventive fire control measures are seldom
related, we observed a higher level of cooperation in fire fighting activities. In order
to deal with any problem that requires a collective e↵ort, either to lift a fallen
horse, clean the streets of the village or fight a fire, any member of the community
can ask for help thanks to the self-insurance institution of ‘mutira˜o’ : i.e. a
collective initiative for the execution of a non remunerated service. A member of
the community asks the group to form the mutira˜o to solve the problem, giving
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rise to another cooperation dilemma: let the others bear the risk of fighting
wildfires, or participate?
The producers interviewed reported physical and psychological shocks, losses of
assets, animals and means of transport used in fire fight. The cost of participation
is high, and given the limited tools available the outcome is highly uncertain.
Moreover helping to fight a fire in a place has the opportunity cost for farmers
of leaving their own property in a helpless situation if fire should arrive there.
However a successful fire-fight in neighboring properties may deviate the wildfire
and avoid fire contagion of their own property. Fire fighting increases in danger
and decreases in e↵ectiveness when areas of degraded forest or grassland are
involved, as flames can a↵ect the treetops, ablaze trees may fall and sparks can
be spread everywhere by the wind.
Nevertheless, by its impromptu emergency nature, it is easier to achieve
cooperation in firefighting than in fire prevention and control. Firefighting usually
limits the damages to crops, but cannot avoid the degradation of the surrounding
forest. In fact, the goal of firefighting is generally to divert the fire out of properties
but not to extinguish it completely.
PrevFogo the specialized branch of IBAMA in prevention of forest fires, o↵ers
training and provides some equipped patrols to assist in fighting small fires.
However, these patrols are definitely not su cient to deal with emergencies: too
few in numbers they only reach the areas connected by roads. Farmers are
often unsatisfied with their work, and tend not to call for help, intimidated by
the inspective style used to gather the information necessary for their reports
(questionnaires, movies, and a little investigation to find a culprit).
In summary, the main di culties in achieving collective action around fire con-
trol are issued from monitoring and rules enforcement di culties, and from a great
deal of uncertainty with respect to the results, due to the non-coincidence between
the geographical proximity in which fire contagion takes place and organizational
proximity in which risk mitigation strategies can be implemented. Transaction
costs to solve the fire control coordination problem in community institutions is
sometimes too high. Community institutions operate at an ine ciently high level
and are unable to provide solutions to neighborhood conflicts. Uncertainty and
enforcement di culties make it hard to build trust and reciprocity, leading to a
non-acceptance of risk and therefore to a preference for a low level equilibrium,
planting low valued crops and setting no or poor fire control measures.
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3.4.3. The adoption of measures to control fire: reciprocity
and market
Reciprocity is key in building trust and cooperation. Market may provide addi-
tional incentives to cooperate, but it may also relax social linkages within the
community, reducing reciprocity.
Many market-oriented farmers have a general preference for cattle-breeding,
because of prices are relatively stable and cattle involves little risk. However, few
farmers have perennials, such as fruit trees or timber. By opposite, in groups
or communities with lower access to market, subsistence agriculture dominates.
Preferences go for roc¸a (annual crops), which constitute the basis of local diet,
and an income source from the sales of the surplus. Livelihood oriented producers
use to share labor force and production in the neighborhood and the community.
In the community of Santa Rosa the first goal of production is livelihood, only
exceeding production is sold to the atraversador (intermediary) that pass monthly
on the river. Most of the production is consumed locally and exchanged as a gift:
‘(. . . ) We consume, we give, here in the colony it is not as in town,
where everything is bought. Here in the colony neighbors give me
some pounds of flour, something from the roc¸a [. . . ]. If somebody is
in the need everybody shares either food or labor. ’ (Seu Dequelo).
Interdependence and reciprocity between members of the community make moni-
toring and sanctioning activities easier and increasing both moral and material
costs of free riding due to the risk of loss of relational and non-relational goods.
The visited communities located closer to the cities are younger, with little
or no forest cover, and usually allocate half of the land with extensive pastures.
On the contrary, communities living in remote areas with poor access to the
market are older, occupy the area since several generations, but retain a greater
forest cover and are opposed to the introduction of cattle breeding. Within the
visited communities, where reciprocity and trust were more intense, forest were
still standing, suggesting that fire accidents have been limited and that collective
action has had a role.
Greater access to the market, however, allows a lower heterogeneity of objectives
among producers in the area, creating greater confidence and certainty with respect
to the control of fire. We observed a group of about twenty neighboring producers
who look after the cattle of a neighboring fazenda iin their ranches. They have
chosen to stop using fire, and have implemented an e↵ective system of fire fighting:
quickly warning and gathering on the side of a little stream from which the
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wildfires usually come, and protecting all the properties. Loosing pasture and
cattle heads would mean for them to loose all means of production and fall into
debt.
‘Fire always come from afar, among neighbors we don’t worry, we’re
all in the same situation’ (Dona Elisangela).
Since five years the system is in e↵ect, and they cancelled the incidence of fires
on their properties. However market access is not a panacea. It reduces the
interdependence between neighbors and thus the possibility of social control.
Access to the market also changes the definition of the situation, the mental model
used to define the problem, encouraging rational behaviours, but crowding out
intrinsic motivations to control fire. In two communities near the city we observed
a sort of Coasean bargain solution, where a neighbor planting perennial crops,
therefore more interested in fire control, paid a worker to build of a firebreak
around the roc¸a of the neighboring property that only had annual crops and was
less interested in fire control.
In other cases intrinsic motivation to control fire were totally crowded out
by expectation linked to possible payment for environmental services by the
government (although no concrete project exists locally), using as argument the
fact that the forest is a public good:
‘If the government wants the forest to stand, the government must
pay2.’ (Seu Adaltinho)
Some other requests toward the government related to public financing or provision
for caterpillars to build firebreaks, or tractors, fertilizers, herbicides and seeds, as
a condition to make an e cient transition out of slash and burn.
This change toward a market orientation can lead to greater investments in
fire control, under the conditions that the capacity to bargain among producers
to get better solutions exists and that the government is willing to pay for
environmental services or to subsidize a transition to mechanization or toward
alternative techniques to the fire. However, in the absence of such conditions
the risk of a reduction in investments in fire control as a result of reduced
intrinsic motivation and dependence from external subsidies may increase. From
the preference for standing forest, to the preference for standing payments or
subsidies.
2 Here the interviewed refers to the pilot program Bolsa Verde of the Brazilian government,
a type of payment for environmental services made in collective management plans to encourage
farmers to respect the rules and limit their roc¸a to 2 ha (but this does not apply in the
communities we visited).
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3.4.4. What role for the community?
We often observed insu cient individual incentives to sanction those who do not
control fire. This appear to be the e↵ect of di culties in identifying the culprit,
the fear of retaliation in terms of relational goods, direct social sanctions or just
the fear of ”appear goofy” and environmental uncertainty. The general acceptance
of a low-level equilibrium leads not only to fires and poverty, but also to a further
serious problem of latent conflicts and missing sanctioning, because people stop
completely claiming compensation or reporting accidents. Lack of sanctioning
takes place on the one hand because under conditions of widespread poverty it is
reasonable to expect that the neighbor is not rich enough to pay compensation,
on the other because investing in fire control measures has become inconvenient,
for everyone. A rule of silence becomes an institution: in which nobody reports
anyone so as not in turn be reported in the future. On the other side, to produce
a rule for fire control is a public good that assumes unacceptable costs for the
individual farmer, and an external intervention is needed to accompany the work
of local leaders. In the words of the president of a local farmer association:
‘We need somebody, somebody powerful and influential that comes
here and speaks to everybody’. (Seu Cearense)
The communities visited always had some levels of organization and centralized
governance. We individuated local associations and the Catholic Church as the
most influential with respect to the fire issue.
Each community is headed by one or more recognized associations, often
created by necessity to interact with the Institute of Agrarian Reform (INCRA),
the intermediary for access to land and credit. However, these associations, are
almost entirely devoted to lobbying the INCRA and the local government, and
show little concern about the internal organization of the community. This brings
to sort of institutional crowding out, in which the energies o↵ered by an elected
leader are entirely devoted in legitimately asking external aid (i.e. in terms of
infrastructures, technical assistance or credit), but disregarding issues related to
internal organization and coordination. The chronic delays of INCRA, a true
bureaucratic legend that has not undergone reforms since its founding in 1970,
have discredited the associations and their presidents within their community.
In all the associations there was a fall in the number of associates and a drastic
reduction in the frequency of meetings: from twice a week, to trimestral, to almost
yearly. Community leaders role have been downgraded to that of secretary for
external governmental institutions, responsible for all failures, devoid of charisma
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and with no role in community organization. In the words of the president of an
association:
‘My job is to ask for outside help’. (Dona Maria)
Some presidents of association denounced a lack of authority that has been created
over time, in which even the most charismatic people no longer have the right
to be heard. The total dependence on public subsidies in the form of transfers,
subsidized credit and technical assistance, make farmers perceive more and more a
dependence toward the government and increasingly less responsibility towards the
environment that surrounds them, by the requests for payments for environmental
services or the demand for fertilizer, herbicide and tractors for free.
In more traditional communities, the Catholic Church has a central role in
local organization. Stands the figure of the coordenador (an elected farmer charged
as deputy priest) and of the also elected coordenadoria , with no or few links with
external organizations, and with the sole task of organizing community life. The
coordenadores have proved more e↵ective than the presidents of the association in
raising awareness about the issues of fire, coming to punish free riders, even with
ad hoc meetings. Nevertheless, the e↵ectiveness of their intervention is highly
variable and depends on their leadership skills.
Of course the priority of every member of a community is primarily to pre-
serve good relations with his neighbors to not loose the benefits of reciprocity.
Applying penalties may create a conflict; unless a free rider brought massive
damages to many farmers, there will be insu cient agreement to sanction an
individual. Seu Raimundo Nene`, who reported a neighbor, explains that the
reason is straightforward:
‘Denouncing is not worth it: I have lost my serenity. Now, when I
hear some noises in the night, even if I imagine it is just a chicken
thief in my backyard, I stay in my bed.’
Another issue concerns the heterogeneity between neighborhoods. The interest of
starting a sanctioning activity in a neighborhood depends on the expected benefits
of a successful collective action. If benefits are uncertain because of the fires coming
from the surrounding neighborhoods, there will be few incentives to produce rules
and to enforce them. Successful collective action in one neighborhood is threatened
by failure in another one. Church and associations can play a role of coordination
between neighborhoods, increasing trust and social capital. However in many
communities the lack of results from lobbying the INCRA has caused divisions
within the associations and a multiplication in their number. The same happened
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with the religious communities that multiplied with the arrival of Evangelical
Churches, Adventist, Jehovah’s Witnesses, etc. Many farmers reported that the
religious functions and meetings of the associations were frequently an opportunity
to discuss topics related to fire use and control in formal or informal ways. People
who would never risk antagonizing a neighbor asked the president of the association
or coordenador to speak publicly against free riders as a form of sanction. Other
strengthened by the group spoke in the first person. Seu Francisco, states:
‘Things have improved. . . People talk in meetings, some people have
even asked me not to call their names! I think they are more careful.’
The aggregative function carried out by the association and the church is par-
ticularly important in those communities where there is no village, where there
is no clear meeting place and farmers built their houses on their plots of land.
The absence of meetings involving all members, and the proliferation of sources of
authority, churches and presidents, further increased the between neighborhood
uncertainty since inter-vicinal meetings occur more rarely, and there is lack of
opportunities to discuss rules and implement social sanctions.
About formal sanctions and access to justice some farmers legitimately argued
that it is not their task to go to neighbors asking for compensation or impose
penalties for accidents, it is rather a government task to impose the rule of law.
With this respect some farsighted presidents called for a return of the authorities:
some exemplary sanctions to be applied, so that their work as coordinators and
sanctioners will be legitimated once more.
‘Everyone knows how to do it [to control fire], but what is lacking is
a punishment. What lacks is understanding, consciousness, meeting
with powerful people.’ (Seu Baiano)
Enforcement of the law by the government in rural Amazon is challenging because
distances are big, and poor infrastructures makes it di cult for policemen to go
to all areas, especially in the rainy season. Only in one community over 15 we
observed a stable police patrol (for about 6.000 farmers of all the Land Reform
settlement). It was settled there only after serious problems linked to drug and
stolen cars trade and child prostitution.
In summary, the task of monitoring and sanctioning in the community is
extremely burdensome because of the lack of legitimacy of sanctioners. The
organizational capacity of the community has long been undermined by dependence
on external institutions. The community leaders have lost their legitimacy, and
the most long-sighted among them claim an external intervention that restores
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authority and predictability with penalties and fines, restoring a role for community
organization. The degradation of the social capital due to the de-legitimization
and multiplication of institutions and the sources of local authorities has further
reduced the opportunity of building trust and reciprocity in the community,
increasing uncertainty about fire contagion and reducing the incentives to apply
sanctions in each neighborhood.
3.4.5. The Biennial Programme of Prevention and Com-
bat to Forest Fires of the municipality of Ipixuna
do Para´
The municipality of Paragominas has not implemented any policy to prevent
fires since 2011 when any use of fire has been prohibited (Law 765/2011). This
prohibition has remained only on paper. Public action described so far concerns
almost only federal agencies such as PrevFogo, the specialized branch of IBAMA,
the technical assistance of EMATER and EMBRAPA and the administration
of INCRA on federal lands. Resources made available from the Secretary of
Agriculture for smallholders are insu cient and goes in the direction of alternatives
to fire, disregarding present problems related to fire control.
In the municipality of Ipixuna we observed a diametrically di↵erent policy
orientation, specifically oriented towards fire control and fire fight rather than
to fire alternatives, entirely conceived by the Secretary of Environment of the
municipality: the Biennial Programme of Prevention and Combat to Forest Fires
of the municipality of Ipixuna do Para´, carried out between 2011 and 2013.
Flagship actions included:
• A new administrative iter to obtain the fire use license, enabling to obtain
the license at the local environmental secretary instead of going to Belem,
the capital of the state which is 250 km away. Lowering travel costs highly
reduced the cost of compliance with the law.
• Improvement in coordination between the various municipal institutions
interested in fire control. This allowed increasing the frequency of controls.
• Fire fight and fire control training has been carried on in several communities.
• Style of the inspectors was mainly oriented to provide appropriate skills
and o↵ering themselves as referees to resolve conflicts between neighbors.
Monetary sanctions in conformance to the law were applied only twice in
two years, one to a smallholder and another one to a latifundist.
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Although the law provides harsh penalties for environmental crimes caused
by fire, reconciliation among farmers causing fires and farmers damaged by fires
was set as a priority. This eliminated much distrust, increased perception of
fire contagion as a crime needing compensation and led farmers to perceive the
inspectors as partners.
‘In fighting fire the role of the community and that of the government
it’s just one, I make no distinctions.’ (Seu Cidalino)
All respondents in the municipality of Ipixuna were aware of the need to apply
for a license for fire use, and that two monetary fines had been applied. Talking
about fires and fire contagion was no longer a taboo; several cases of monitoring
and social sanctions applied within the community were reported in interviews.
Seu Felisardo states:
‘Since two years there have been no more accidents, now everybody
requires a license [. . . ]. Three others and myself went to control [the
neighboring properties], and we found that he [the neighbor] had not
made a meter of firebreak! We spied him to check if he was able to
control fire anyhow [. . . ]. Before the law [the license] nobody was
building firebreaks!!’
The law mentioned by the farmers is the licensing system, before which there
was no knowledge about the legal obligation to control fire.
According to the Secretary of the Environment the initial goal to reduce
urban air pollution from smoke during the fire season was achieved, reducing
fires. Moreover interviews show that this program also proved to be extremely
e↵ective in reducing fire risk perception and perceived legitimacy of sanctioners
among farmers. None of the respondents in the municipality of Ipixuna recalls
fire incidents during the two years of the program, and the project manager
reports that more than 200 licenses have been granted each year. A reduced risk
perception, an increased e↵ectiveness of the licensing system and little memory of
fires during the period of the programme indicate a higher compliance level to the
law in Ipixuna than in Paragominas.
The attractiveness of this policy lies not only in its e↵ectiveness, but also in its
reduced costs: about 22.000 over two years. Other policies such as the promotion
of mechanization or intensive techniques are in fact much more expensive, and
raise doubts about their appropriateness and ecological impact.
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3.5. Discussion: the emergence of rules that fa-
cilitate cooperation
3.5.1. The role of institutions
The main problem in achieving a collective action success in the fire control
dilemma comes from the di culty in monitoring and enforcing rules and from
the great deal of uncertainty of collective action outcome. The non-coincidence
between the geographical proximity in which fire contagion takes place and the
organized proximities in which it is possible to agree on rules for fire control
had a magnifying e↵ect on the challenge of monitoring and enforcing rules. On
the one hand higher level organized proximities are not su ciently “thick” to
counteract local conflict, for instance: farmers can agree on fire control within
an association, but without all the members of a neighborhood being part of the
association. On the other hand organized proximities may operate at an ine cient
scale to guarantee coordination: farmers may undertake collective action in a
neighborhood, but for fire control to be e↵ective it is necessary that agreement
spread among neighborhoods. Monitoring and geographical proximities mismatch
makes it di cult to build trust and reciprocity, leading to a non-acceptance of risk
and therefore to the preference for a low level equilibrium, with less investments
in fire control and few fire sensitive crops. Even if a higher financial return can
be expected from fire sensitive crops, i.e. fruit and tree plantation (Almeida and
Uhl, 1995; Browder et al., 2005; Hoch et al., 2012; Vosti et al.), Pokorny et al.
(2012) show that fire has threatened crops in two thirds of 50 case studies of tree
plantations they reviewed.
The link between fire control and market access, though exalted in the literature,
remains ambiguous. On the one hand, old and isolated communities with high
levels of reciprocity retain a greater area of forest cover. On the other market
provides access to more resources and incentives to invest in fire control and can
create homogeneity of goals; but it can also cause motivational crowding out.
Increasing market orientation may paradoxically increase dependence on public
subsidies in the form of increased demand for subsidized mechanization, subsidized
credit, roads and infrastructure, and reducing the bonds of interdependence in
the community and degrading social capital (Pokorny et al., 2012).
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3.5.2. The role of situational framing
Landscape flammability is key in determining costs and benefits of fire control
either in virgin as in excessively degraded areas. In the first because the benefits
of collective action to control fire are too low, as the forest is moist and fires are
unlikely; in the second because the costs of controlling fire are too high and it
could be hard to find su cient agreement among farmers.
The climatic alea is also acknowledged as a determinant of forest flammability,
and thus the need for fire control. Farmers are scared of large fires and are
sometimes convinced that there is no conceivable role for their agency in controlling
fires. The larger variability of weather events and the related e↵ects on fire control
e↵ectiveness produce a kind of noise in farmers’ perceptions (Brondizio and Moran,
2008). As a result local perspectives confounds about the e↵ectiveness of fire
control measures. A poor perception of risk factors leads to non-acceptance of the
risk and to the non-adoption of fire prone behaviours (Pe´gard, 2010).
Results exalt the role of situational framing as a crucial element in the fire
control choice. If fire damages are considered taboo, producing a rule for fire
control and monitoring and enforcing the rule is almost impossible. Carmenta et
al. (2013) found that nobody of the 163 interviews ever demanded compensation
for damages and asking if there was any procedure to set compensations she got
the answer: ‘No, we don’t have this here. It burnt? Then it burnt’. Indicating
that no mechanism to recuperate damages due to fire escape exists. This fact has
been widely observed in most of the communities visited in Paragominas. On the
other side all the interviewed farmers from the municipality of Ipixuna reported
di↵erent feelings. Controls carried out by the Secretary of Environment have
increased confidence in cooperative behaviour between neighborhoods, reducing
the uncertainty caused by fires ‘that come from far away’. This has increased the
expected benefits of collective action in the neighborhood, increasing incentives to
control fire and to monitor and sanction free riding neighbors. The existence of
clear and well-known laws and the implementation of the licensing system have
legitimized the action of sanctioners, reducing free-riding.
Fire was no more a taboo, but a debatable issue.
This corresponds to a change in actor framing. According to the theory of
compliance, the e↵ectiveness of coercive policies depends on the fear of the controls
and of the sanctions (Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999). It may seem surprising how the
limited resources available to the Ipixuna fire prevention program, and the limited
threat of fines (only two monetary fines applied over two years) on a territory
as vast as those of a municipality in the Amazon, have been su cient to achieve
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a similar result. Changing actor framing in the direction of collective action
may explain the high compliance level and the change in perceptions reported in
interviews.
In Paragominas the government has betrayed expectations, and social capital
degraded. Solving the commitment problem it is harder since controlling fire has
become inconvenient: it is not possible to form reasonable expectations about an
internal collective action solution. Some farmers preferred attempting to find exit
strategies that are often relatively expensive and little a↵ordable for most of them.
Exit strategies include migration to virgin areas or with smaller fire risk, or hire
heavy tractors to build firebreaks around the whole property.
IIn Ipixuna farmers perceive governmental agents as a partner not as controller,
the fire control program was perceived as supportive and not controlling of farmer
practices, though it is fair to suppose that a crowding in e↵ect operated, increasing
incentives to set fire control measures.
The program not only had a direct e↵ect of deterrence, but has benefited
from an indirect multiplier e↵ect, by reducing incentives for free riding, reducing
the cost of sanctions, increasing trust between neighborhoods, and increasing the
benefits of collective action in favor of the control of fire.
In the end, poor coordination between neighborhoods, di culties in setting and
enforcing rules, an unfavorable situational framing, and the di culty to update
rules as a function of the changing surrounding environment explain why social
capital (Simmons et al., 2004) and commitment to the community (Carmenta et
al., 2013) have not led to increased investments in fire control. The apparent unity
of a community may conceal enormous latent conflicts due to damages caused by
the spread of fire between neighbors.
3.5.3. Improving the policy space
Public intervention up to now has individualized the problem of fire control
insisting on technical aspects (Coudel et al., 2013, Sorrensen, 2009). It accelerated
the degradation of the quality of community institutions, reducing the intrinsic
motivation to control fire through welfare policies and shifting collective action
e↵ort from fire control to the leverage of external resources.
Public intervention ought to strive towards facilitating cooperation for the
adoption of fire control measures, and not just providing individual skills, because
farmers may have no incentives to adopt them.
The activity of PrevFogo has always been prone to provide trainings and
patrols helping in fire fight. However, the e↵ects of these actions are modest
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because the adoption of the suggested practices can be ine cient either in virgin
or in excessively degraded areas.
PrevFogo prioritizes intervention on two criteria: the frequency of fires in
the past and an ex-ante prioritization of areas: Protected Areas first, such as
Indigenous Reserves, and Land Reform Settlements follow.
Focusing prevention interventions in the communities where collective action
is still a sustainable option would be an e↵ective criterion to reduce fire contagion.
Collective action depends on a large array of factors, and among them on landscape
features. Thus public intervention should prioritize areas where costs of collective
action are still a↵ordable (thus not excessively degraded areas), or where benefits
of collective action are su ciently high (not areas with perfect forest cover).
As Brondizio and Moran (2008) suggest, improving information about climatic
conditions may reinforce incentives to invest in fire control measures when benefits
are higher, i.e. when long summers and drought are expected.
With respect to communities in degraded areas, it is unlikely that they will
achieve su cient agreement for a successful collective action solution because
the costs of controlling fire are too high with respect to the e↵ectiveness of fire
control measures. A transition out of slash and burn through the adoption of
farming techniques with low or no use of fire (as slash and mulch, vegetables or
perennial crops, or by subsidizing the adoption of mechanization and fertilizers)
could be part of the solution. Improving market and credit access and providing
appropriate technical assistance can be a good tool for aligning the expectations
of policy makers and the motivations of farmers. However, perennial crops and
market access have failed to provide su cient incentives to abandon fire, while
local solutions are less prone to su↵er ownership problems (Hoch et al., 2012;
Pokorny et al., 2012). In particular, market-based solutions require widespread
entrepreneurship and willingness to undertake economic risks, those conditions
have been rarely observed in the 15 communities visited.
Empty properties threaten cooperation on fire control, increasing uncertainty
of the collective action outcome and reducing the expected benefits. It would
therefore be appropriate to have more control on the residence of the owners. This
action is usually delegated to local associations. Restoring farmer’s confidence in
associations is necessary for associations to achieve their goals. The importance
of a centralized coordination or hierarchy in solving problems of collective action
is evident in the literature (Lichbach, 1996). In this regard it would be expedient
to reform INCRA in order to increase the speed of response to the demands of
communities and reduce farmers dependence on outside institutions, allowing the
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revitalization of associations and social capital in communities.
Where fire control is not implemented due to the commitment trap, as it
has been largely observed, public action should be aimed at restoring confidence
in the communities and reducing the cost of sanctioning to solve the second
level collective action dilemma. Local policies can be e↵ective in achieving this
goal. This has been well demonstrated in the case of the Biennial Programme
of Prevention and Combat to Forest Fires implemented in the municipality of
Ipixuna do Para´.
3.6. Conclusion
Forest fires do not appear to decrease hand in hand with deforestation (Aragao
and Shimabukuro, 2010), and threaten the savanization of the Amazon rainforest
(Nepstad et al., 1999). Current policies have so far proved ine↵ective in stopping
this trend. There is a lack of field studies aimed at understanding phenomena
that lead to fires (Carmenta et al., 2011). The common hypothesis of exogenous
fire risk in the studies carried out so far has limited current research and led to
individualize the problem of underinvestment in fire control measures.
Assuming that the risk of fire spread is exogenous with respect to the individual,
but endogenous in the neighborhood, there emerges a collective action dilemma
that often leads to a low-level equilibrium with poor control of fire and little
productive investments. In order to find a solution to the collective action dilemma
it is necessary to understand the process of actor choice and create policies that
align farmers motivation and policy makers goals.
We described the main reasons driving the choice to control fire or not and the
emergence of collective action. In particular discussed the role of the main formal
and informal institutions involved in fire prevention: neighborhood, mutira˜o,
church, local association and the municipal government. We identified multiple
scales at which collective action may take place and the mismatch of geographical
and organized proximities, the implication of adverse situational framing for
collective action likelihood and the factors a↵ecting compliance to the fire control
law.
In the following Chapter we take stock of current knowledge to sketch a simple
formal model representing the main features of the fire control choice.
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Chapter 4
The determinants of fire control
choice
4.1. Introduction
In this Chapter, taking stock of knowledge acquired during the field work (Chapter
3), from literature review (Chapter 1) and of methodological issues (Chapter 2),
we model farmer choice to set fire control measures. As emphasized by Morello
(2013), the choice of investing in fire prevention measures is close to that of
choosing the optimal investment in wildfire protection through defensible space
studied by Shafran (2008). Here we discuss Shafran’s argument in the context of
fire control, showing that multiple equilibria may exist, and that farmers may get
stuck at low-level equilibria if there is insu cient agreement/coordination to set
fire control measures. We also show that when farmers are stuck in a high risk
equilibria they may cope with risk substituting fire sensitive investments with non
fire sensitive investments. Thus high fire risk may impede a transition out of fire
use.
In the following we sketch a model to determine the optimal investment in
fire control measures based on the previous work of Bowman et al. (2008). The
rationale of such a model is that risk decreases because of increasing likelihood of
collective action (increasing trust and social capital), marginal benefit of allocating
labor to fire control measures increases, but the opportunity cost of not allocating
labor to productive investment, increases as well. In the third and forth section
we will test econometrically the determinants of investment in five fire control
measures, showing that trust and social capital are important and significant
predictors with positive sign.
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4.2. Theoretical models
4.2.1. The definition of risk
Households face both internal and external risk. Internal risk is the risk of fire
originating in the own property  (LP ),  0(LP ) < 0. It is totally endogenous
and depends negatively on the amount of labor allocated to fire prevention LP .
External risk originates from fire contagion among properties. This has two
components:
- an exogenous component,  , including all factors that farmers can’t change,
at least in the short term, as landscape type, meteorological conditions and extreme
weather events such as El nin˜o.
- an endogenous component ⇢( ), ⇢0( ) < 0, where  (ZLp) is the likelihood
of collective action, i.e. the likelihood that a norm for fire control emerge in the
neighborhood. Collective action likelihood increases as the household is more
likely to reciprocate allocating more labor to fire prevention, and as Z, a vector of
other factors a↵ecting collective action increases. Z is considered as exogenous to
the ith farmer: it includes essentially social capital and trust and depends also on
neighbors’ e↵ort to mitigate their own internal risk: Z = Z[ j(LP,j)] 8j 6= i.
Thus p, the risk of fire event on a given property, is an increasing function of
 , ⇢ and  .
4.2.2. The strategic dimension of risk management
In order to model the strategic interaction in deciding how much labor allocate to
fire control measures we reformulate Shafran’s (2008) argument about strategic
interaction in setting defensible space around houses to mitigate fire risk at the
wild-urban interface. Suppose fire risk depends on the amount of labor allocated
to fire control measures by the farmer, on collective action likelihood and on the
exogenous risk faced by each farmer.
p = p(LP,i, , i). (4.1)
For sake of simplicity we substitute the likelihood of collective action, i.e. the
likelihood of a shared norm for fire control to emerge, with collective action
outcome: the sum of labor allocated to fire prevention measures by neighbors:
LP, i =
P
(j 6=i)  j(LP,j).
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Thus:
p = p(LP,i, LP, i, i) (4.2)
with p increasing in  and decreasing in LP,i, LP, i, and we assume diminishing
return on labor allocated to fire prevention measures. The farmer maximizes his
utility corresponding to the expected consumption: i.e. income minus the cost of
fire prevention minus losses due to a fire event occurrence.
Ui = Yi(La,i)  p(LP,i, LP, i, i)  (4.3)
where   stand for losses. Income Yi is a positive marginally decreasing function
of time allocated to production La,i, where the time constraint is L = La,i + LP,i.
The first order condition to maximize individual utility is
Y1 = p1(LP,i, LP, i, i)  (4.4)
where the subscript 1 denotes the first order derivative with reference to LP,i.
Relation 4.4 means there is equilibrium when the marginal cost of missed income
(Yi) is equal to the marginal benefit from avoided losses due to risk mitigation
(pi ). The first order condition to maximize the sum of individual utilities is
Y1 = p1(LP,i, LP, i, i)  +
X
(j 6=i)
p2(LP,i, LP, i, i)  (4.5)
where p2 is the first derivative with reference to LP,i of the probability of fire
on other’s property as a result of ith farmer’s e↵ort in controlling fire, which is
positive. Since the right hand terms are negative in both equation 4.4 and 4.5, we
conclude that the amount of LP,i that satisfy equation 4.4 is lower than the one
satisfying equation 4.5. Thus the amount of LP,i chosen by a farmer that maximize
his utility is ine ciently low. Ine ciency arises because a risk externality occur
discouraging investments in fire control measures.
Totally di↵erentiating equation 4.4 we obtain the elasticity of farmer’s labor
devoted to fire control to the amount of labor devoted by neighbors to the same
task:
dLP,i
dLP, i
=
p12(LP,i, LP, i, i)
Y11   p11(LP,i, LP, i, i) (4.6)
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Assume the numerator is negative (i.e. the impact of an increase of neighbors
labor decrease the fire risk on ith farmer plot, increasing incentives to invest in
fire control). Since we assume diminishing return on La,i, the denominator is
negative until Y11 > p11(LP,i, LP, i, i). If denominator is positive (i.e. the benefits
of allocating labor to fire control are lower than benefits of allocating it to income
production) investments in fire control by the ith farmers and the neighbors are
strategic substitutes. If denominator is negative (i.e. the benefits of allocating
labor to fire control are higher than benefits of allocating it to income production)
then strategic complementarities arise. This is a supermodular game and multiple
Nash equilibria may arise (Topkis, 1979; Vives, 1990) and can be Pareto ranked
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Equilibria with high amount of labor allocated
to fire control are preferred, since increase utility in 4.3, but it can also be that
farmers get trapped in a low level equilibria when everybody invests less in fire
control measures. As shown in Chapter 3 several mechanisms may lead to select
a low level equilibrium.
4.2.3. Fire risk as a cause of lock in e↵ect
It can be that when farmers face high risk and has low incentives to invest in fire
control measures they cope with risk by self insuring, substituting higher value
fire sensitive crops (B) with lower value non fire sensitive crops (A).
Suppose that the farmer, aware of neighbor behavior, has already chosen the
optimal amount of LP and, given   and  , takes fire risk p⇤ as given. If he chooses
to plant fire sensitive crop he would get:
E(U) = UB = (1  p⇤)QBPB  KB (4.7)
where QB is the output quantity, PB is the output price and KB is the cost of
production. If he plants non fire sensitive crops he would get instead:
E(U) = UA = QAPA  KA . (4.8)
Given the predetermined level of risk he will plant fire sensitive crops only if for
any quantity of A and B, UB > UA holds:
QBPB
QAPA
  KB
KA
>
1
(1  p⇤) . (4.9)
In order to satisfy condition 4.9 and facilitate a transition, market should provide
a large enough price premium for B crop or p⇤ must decrease. This may happen
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because of a fall in exogenous risk  , or to an exogenous increase in Z and hence
an increase of collective action and a fall in neighborhood risk ⇢. Figure 4.1
represent equations 4.7 and 4.8 in a situation of low price premium and/or high
risk (U1B), and in a situation of low risk and/or high price premium (U
2
B).
Figure 4.1: E↵ect of a fall in exogenous risk or of a collective action surge on the
utility of planting A or B crops.
4.2.4. The optimal investment in fire control measures
Building on Bowman et al. (2008) and relaxing their assumptions that only an
agricultural good exists and fire risk is entirely exogenous, we aim finding the
conditions for optimal labor investments in fire control measures. Farmer sets
fire control measures before he face fire risk with probability p of contagion or
internal accident, and (1  p) probability of no fire event.
Therefore, households expected utility is
E(U) = pUF + (1  p)U0 (4.10)
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where U j (j = F for fire and j = 0 in absence of fire) is a standard concave utility
function increasing in both consumed goods and leisure:
U j = [X, N j, Qc,A, Q
j
c,B, l,⌦] 8j = F, 0. (4.11)
where Qjc,A and Q
j
c,B are the consumption level of agricultural goods A and B. B
is not fire sensitive, while B is fire sensitive, X is a vector of all non agricultural
goods, N j is the amount consumed of non timber forest products (NTFP’s), l
indicates leisure and ⌦ is a vector of household features.
The household can allocate labor L and land S to the production of NTFP’s
(LN , SF ), non fire sensitive crops (LA, SA) and fire sensitive crops (LB, SB). The
household can also decide to allocate labor to fire prevention measures,1 Lp,
gaining a positive and marginally decreasing protective e↵ect on NTFP’s and fire
sensitive crops ↵(Lp), and mitigating risk p (see equation 4.1).
Consumption functions for NTFP’s and production functions for agricultural
goods are:
N0 ⌘ N(LN , SF ;⌦) (4.12)
NF ⌘ ↵(LP )N(LN , SF ;⌦) (4.13)
Qp,A ⌘ Qp,A[SA, K, LA, Lh,A;⌦] (4.14)
Q0p,B ⌘ Qp,B[SB, K, LB, Lh,B;⌦] (4.15)
QFp,B ⌘ ↵(Lp)Qp,B[SB, K, LB, LhB;⌦] (4.16)
where Lh,B, Lh,A is hired labor and K is capital. Household maximize utility
subject to a cash budget constraint:
PA[Qp,A(.) Qc,A]+PB{p(.)[QFp,B(.) QFcB]+[1 p(.)][Q0p,B Q0c,B]}+I = WhLh+P0xX
(4.17)
a land constraint
S = SF + SA + SB (4.18)
1 Fire control measures are labor intensive activities. Since smallholders has little access
to mechanized tools to build firebreaks this is a labor intensive activity (Bowman et al., 2008;
Nepstad et al., 1999). Moreover as Carmenta (2013) reports, implementing others fire control
measures such as burning against the wind, waiting for the first rain, or in the late hours of the
day may not result in “good burnt” and may require further work to clear land, chop logs or
pull out weeds. This applies to slash and burn for roc¸a as in fires for pasture renewal.
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and a time constraint
T = LA + LB + LN + LP + l (4.19)
where I is the exogenous income and Wh, and Px are wage rate of hired labor
and the vector of prices of non agricultural goods, respectively. Substituting 4.18
and 4.19 in 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16; 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16 into 4.17 and 4.12; 4.13 in
4.11 and 4.11 in 4.10 and taking PA as numeraire, thus P =
PB
PA
we can write the
following Lagrangean:
Max
LP
⇣ = p { , ⇢[ (ZLP )],  (LP )}UF [X,↵(LP )N(SF , LN ;⌦), Qc,A, QFc,B, l;⌦]
+ (1-p){ , ⇢[ (ZLP )],  (LP )}U0[X, N(SF , LN ;⌦), Qc,A, Q0c,B, l;⌦]
+ 
⇢
[QpA(SA, K, LA, Lh,A;⌦) Qc,A]
+P
n
p{ , ⇢[ (ZLP )],  (LP )}[↵(LP )QFp,B(SB, K, LB, Lh,B;⌦) Q0c,B]
+(1-p){ , ⇢[ (ZLP )],  (LP )}[Q0p,B(SB, K, LB, Lh,B;⌦) Q0c,B]
o
+I  WhLh  P0xX
 
. (4.20)
The first order condition for optimal allocation of labor to fire prevention
measures is:
⇣
dp
d 
d 
dLP
+ dpd⇢
d⇢
d 
d 
dLP
Z
⌘
[(UF   U0) +  (QFp,B  QFc,B  Q0p,B +Q0c,B)]
+p
⇣
dUF
d↵
d↵
dLP
N +  PQp,B
d↵
dLP
⌘
=p
⇣
dUF
dNF
dNF
dLP
+ dU
F
dLP
+  P
dQFp,B
dLP
⌘
+(1  p)
⇣
dU0
dN0
dN0
dLP
+ dU
0
dLP
+  P
dQ0p,B
dLP
⌘
+  dQp,AdLP . (4.21)
The household will engage in fire prevention up to a point in which the marginal
net benefits of diminishing risk plus the marginal benefits from increasing self-
protection (↵) given the level of risk equalize the expected opportunity cost of
leisure, NTFP collection and production of A and B crops. However, a corner
solution may exist: the household will not engage in fire prevention if, for Lp = 0,
the left hand side of the equation is lower than the right hand side.
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As collective action likelihood   increases because of an exogenous increase
in social capital and trust Z, marginal benefits of allocating labor to fire control
increase as well. However, also the opportunity cost of not allocating labor to
productive investment increases, providing more incentives to free ride. Collective
action theory predicts that trust, social capital, cooperation and reciprocity change
in the same way, explaining both collective action successes and failures (Ostrom,
2010). Thus, in our framework, marginal benefits of cooperation should be higher
than the marginal costs of free riding.
4.3. Econometric model
In this section we test empirically the theoretical findings of the previous section.
Specifically, our expectation is to reject the null hypothesis that when trust and
social capital are high, then Lp decreases.
Moreover we expect that social capital and trust will play a role more important
than other variables in determining fire control. This will be done estimating the
following relations that are reduced form of equation 4.21:
Pr(Lp = 1) =
eX
0
p 
1 + eX
0
p 
(4.22)
and
Pr(LP = nP ) =
e X
0
p (X0p )
np
np!
(4.23)
Equation 4.22 is estimated using a probit model where   is a vector of parameters
to be estimated, Xp is a vector of independent variables and Lp is a binary
dependent variables corresponding to each one of the five fire control measures
that can be implemented by farmers, i.e. clearing firebreaks, adopt backfire,
burn in the later colder hours of the day, burn after the first rains and alert
the neighbors before burning. Equation 4.23 is estimated using Poisson models
where Lp is approximated by the count (nP ) of the number of daywork devoted
to build firebreaks and by the number of fire control measures implemented by
the household.
62
4.3.1. Data
The dataset used for the econometric estimations was provided by Sustainable
Amazon Network (RAS)2 database.
Data was collected between April 2010 in terms of August 2011 in Santarem-
Belterra and Paragominas. The two regions di↵er both history, land use and
biophysical characteristics. The first was already a center of pre-Colombian
civilizations, while Paragominas has been founded in 1959.
The socioeconomic data we use have been collected along with ecological
data3. A nested sampling design has been used, by watershed and by deforestation
gradient, mapping all smallholders property in each catchment and randomly
selecting a maximum of 20 properties with at least one hectar producing in 2009.
Some other farmers were sampled based on ecological study transect defined to
collect ecological data.
Data for price variables are kriging estimates kindly provided by Thiago Morello
(Morello, 2013).
4.3.2. Estimation models
Before going for model identification some econometric issues need to be addressed,
namely, the temporal inconsistency of data, the endogeneity of non timber forest
product collection and the specification of the model.
Data have been collected between 2010 and 2011. When questions are not
retrospective (i.e. do not span over a period longer than one year), data refer to the
data collection period or to the last agricultural production season. Specifically,
land use data refers to 2009 and to the burning activity of end 2008. Data
concerning firebreaks are available for 2008. However all others data, either
dependent or independent variables, refer to the data collection period.
In estimating the models concerning the implementation of firebreaks and the
time allocated to firebreaks we assume that those variable are stable across 2008
and the data collection period. Since building firebreaks is a labor intensive activity
depending on the size of the agricultural plot we assumed time consistency only
between the dependent variables and the land use data. This may be problematic
2 Sustainable Amazon Network ( Rede Amazonia Sustentavel, c.f.
http://www.redeamazoniasustentavel.org/), is the result of a huge undertaking by more than 30
research organization that decided to cooperate on an interdisciplinary ground in order to assess
the land-use sustainability in the Brazilian Amazon.
3 Further information on sampling design, data collection process, the context of the study
and the RAS project are discussed in Gardner et al. (2013).
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for a causal interpretation of the models4 because, considering the typical feedback
between collective action outcome, social capital and trust, coe cients in those
two models may represent e↵ects rather than causes.
In the theoretical model we assume that the decision to allocate labor to
NTFPs collection is simultaneous to the choice of allocating labor to fire control
measures. This means that the amount of consumed NTFP is endogenous. When
an endogenous regressor is erroneously included in the model, estimates are
distorted and biased, and a two stage instrumental variable procedure is needed
(Wooldridge 2002).
Unfortunately we don’t have adequate instruments available. Replicating the
model used in Bowman et al., (2008) with available data we only found weak
correlations, a clear symptom of weak instruments. Adopting a 2SLS estimation
with weak instruments, ‘the cure can be worse than the disease’ (Bound et
al.,1993; 1995): estimated coe cients are not unique and can produce inconsistent
standard errors. As far as the author knows, there are no diagnostic tests for weak
instruments available for non linear models (i.e. probit) (Stock et al., 2002), and
there are no routines available to test weak instruments in models with binary
first stage and Poisson second stage as we would require. In order to get more
robust estimates we chose to drop the variable related to NTFP collection.
Table 4.1 show the choice of proxy variables.
Seven models have been estimated using as independent variable five fire
control measures, the amount of work dedicated to building firebreaks and the
number of fire control measures adopted. The five fire control measures concerned
are building firebreaks, implement backfire (burn against the wind), alert neighbors
before burn, wait for the last, colder hours of the days with less wind, and wait
for the first rain before burning in order to have a damp environment around the
burnt plot. All the above fire control measures are labor intensive, either in terms
of labor to implement the fire control measure or in terms of not achieving a good
burn, and need to invest more work in order to chop logs and manually remove
weeds (Carmenta, 2013).
We identified a unique pattern of independent variables XP explaining all five
fire control measures and the two proxies for fire control intensity (Table 4.1).
An ad-hoc dataset was prepared for each estimated model because of missing
data, however little variability exists between the samples used to estimate each
4 It should be emphasized that the empirical models estimated here are not to be considered
as causal models, but essentially as counting frequency in the sample. Moreover there is no
ambition to infer results beyond the sample to a larger population. In this study generalization
of results is only made up by triangulation.
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Table 4.1: Description of the independent variables
Proxy Variable name Expected sign
Prices
Manioc flour price manioc flour price (+)
Black pepper price pepper price (+)
Dependence on agricultural income
Receive governmental subsidies/transfers (0/1) gov transfer (+/ )
Social capital
Prticipate in the religious community(0/1) church (+)
Number of associations in which participates n association (+)
Trust in neighbors
Quality of neighbors rank [1,3] neighbors trust (+)
Received neighbor help in agricultural tasks
including fire (0/1) neighbors help (+)
Fire prevention courses
Whether the farmer ever experienced trainings
on fire prevention (0/1) training (+)
Education
Education level of the household head
equal or above secondary education (0/1) education (+)
Demographic household features
Number of children aged 0 to 14. n children ( )
Number of man in working age: 15 to 59 n men (+)
Land-use/landscape flammability
Area of primary forest in 2009 a pri forest ( )
Area of secondary forest in 2009 a sec forest (+)
Area of pastures in 2009 a pasture (+)
Area of annual crops in 2009 a annual (+)
Area of perennial crops 2009 a perennial (+)
model, and comparability among results seems to not be a↵ected. Table 4.2 report
summary statistics for variables from the ‘after rain’ dataset. Similar Tables for
the other dataset are reported in Appendix C.
In accordance to the brasilian law (Law 8.629/93) we defined smallholders as
those owing a property under four fiscal modules, that account for 100 hectars in
Paragominas and 300 hectares in Santarem. For this reason there are household
in the sample with up to 200 ha of primary forest. However property size can
diminish down to 1 ha, and land use proxies consequently show a high variability.
In this dataset farmers adopted on average 2.9 fire control measures out of the
five types considered; 81% of households report to build firebreaks, spending on
average 5 days working on it. The most implemented practices after firebreaks
clearing are backfire (63%) and alert neighbors (81%). In contrast, only 7,5% of
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics: after rain dataset
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dependent variables
firebreaks 01 0.818 0.387 0 1 110
backfire 0.632 0.484 0 1 133
alert neighbors 0.813 0.391 0 1 134
after rain 0.552 0.499 0 1 134
late hours 0.075 0.265 0 1 133
firebreaks days 4.527 5.343 0 30 110
n fcm 2.815 1.232 0 5 108
Independent variables
manioc flour price 1.178 0.33 0.541 1.601 134
pepper price 3.237 0.428 2.623 4.206 134
gov transfer 0.739 0.42 0 1 134
church 0.659 0.46 0 1 134
n association 1.022 0.78 0 3 134
neighbors trust 2.792 0.451 1 3 134
neighbors help 0.067 0.251 0 1 134
training 0.216 0.413 0 1 134
education 0.067 0.251 0 1 134
n children 1.478 1.805 0 10 134
n men 1.5 1.273 0 6 134
a pri forest 16.249 29.102 0 200 134
a sec forest 19.166 20.996 0 119.13 134
a pasture 5.999 12.699 0 95.600 134
a annual 1.835 1.753 0 10 134
a perennial 0.468 1.371 0 12.5 134
farmers use to burn in the late coolers hours of the day with less wind.
Households on average are composed by the same number of children (1.48)
and men (1.5) in working age, and only 6.7% of the household-head holds a
secondary degree. The number of working men is a proxy for labor availability
to the household. The number of children is a proxy for the number of inactive
member of the household demanding care and expenditure, an opportunity cost
with respect to the implementation of fire control. We haven’t included the elderly
because they usually receive a retirement pension, and they can contribute by
hiring dayworkers. Since we don’t have enough data to control for hired laborers
we didn’t considered them in the model. Indeed 73% of farmers included in the
sample receive cash transfer from the government, either in the form of Bolsa
Familia, either in the form of retirement or deficiency pension. This is a sign of
poverty, but also of cash availability.
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Social capital proxies indicate that there is high participation in religious
activities, and that on average each household refer to at least one association.
Trust in neighbors is high, but reciprocity in agricultural practices is low, less
than 10%. More than 20% of respondents have attended courses on fire use and
fire fight either from government agencies or from NGO’s such as IPAM5.
4.3.3. Estimation results
All estimate details and average marginal e↵ects for probit models are reported in
Appendix C. Table 4.3 shows estimation results for participation in the five fire
control measures. Table 4.4 refer to estimates concerning the intensity of the fire
control measures implemented.
Some variables are omitted to ensure convergence of ML estimators, because
they were perfectly predicting outcome, and need to be dropped. Summary
statistics report the number of observation, the pseudo6 R2, and the p-value
resulting from the  2 test for joint significance of all variables. The pseudo R2
is sometimes very low, however the goal of this study is not the identification of
a predictive model for engagement in fire control measures, rather is to test the
relevance of social capital and trust in this choice. For this reason we privilege a
low  2 test p-value and consistency of estimates.
Proxies for social capital and trust are often significant and always positive
(with only two exceptions, but coe cients are close to 0). Participation in church
activities and the number of associations in which the household is involved are
significative on three fire control measures. Moreover in some cases those variables
had to be dropped because they perfectly predicted outcome, this is the case
for the third and the fifth models. Trust in the neighborhood is particularly
important, especially for the intensity of participation in fire control. This variable
is significant on five models over seven, indicating that the neighborhood is the
most important level at which collective action takes place.
Coe cients for price variables are often significant and positive, because as the
value of crops increase, then the value of a reduced risk or of a higher protection
increase as well. However signs are sometimes unexpected as in the late hours
model.
5 The ‘Instituto de pesquisa ambiental da Amazoˆnia’ is an NGO and research institute
working since 18 years for sustainable development in the Amazon. http://www.ipam.org.br/
6 The pseudo R2 presented in all Tables is the Mc Fadden’s R2 that can’t be interpreted as
the standard OLS R2 (share of explained variance over total variance). Mc Fadden’s R2 is the
ratio between the log likelihood of the full model and the log likelihood of the null (the model
with only the constant term). It range between 0 and 1, and represent the level of improvement
with respect to the null model.
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Table 4.4: Summary Table: estimates results
for intensity of fire control measures
Poisson
firebreaks (days) n fcm
manioc flour price -0.006 0.585***
pepper price 0.107 0.162*
gov transfer 0.133 0.022
church 0.358* 0.135
n association 0.143* 0.059
neighbors trust 0.816*** 0.374***
neighbors help 0.212 0.314**
training 0.178 0.114
education -0.203 0.089
n children -0.153*** -0.032
n men 0.063 0.020
a pri forest -0.002 0.000
a sec forest 0.002 0.003
a pasture 0.007 0.002
a annual 0.195*** 0.017
a perennial -0.015 0.022
Constant -2.110* -1.588***
Pseudo R2 0.211 0.071
N 110 108
 2 test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000
⇤p < 0.1; ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05; ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01
The presence of governmental transfer has little or no e↵ect on the decision to
set LP . With the important exception of the late hours model, fire management
training has also little e↵ect. However we may expect that some of the e↵ect of
trainings feedback on social capital and neighbors trust because after trainings
there are more reasons to expect higher fire control by other farmers. Education
is never significant, however it has been dropped from the first equation because
it perfectly predicted success.
The demographic composition of the household is almost never significant,
showing that the labor constraint is probably not binding. However the number
of men in working age is quite sensitive to the functional form definition: the
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logarithm of n men, reflecting decreasing marginal productivity of labor, is highly
significant in explaining the number of days allocated to building firebreaks and
the decision to burn after the first rain7.
Although the option to include the logarithm of n men would have increased
coherence with the theoretical model we have chosen to drop it because it would
have largely reduced the number of observation available, transforming into missing
all observations for n men=0, whose logarithm goes to minus infinite.
The e↵ect of land use and landscape type reflects technical parameters involving
the e cacy of fire prevention measures relative to landscape type and flammability.
Indeed those variables a↵ect the decision to engage in fire control measures, but
have little or no e↵ect on the intensity of fire control.
When primary forest cover is high, then fires are less likely to spread out of
the plot and there are lower incentives to adopt backfire or to burn when wind is
low because since risk is already low there are little marginal benefits in further
reducing risk. This e↵ect became ambiguous when the area of secondary forest
increase. Secondary forest still provide a protection from fire contagion, but when
it burns fire can have more disruptive e↵ects. In pasture dominated landscapes,
the most flammable one, farmers are more prone to set fire control measures,
in particular backfire and burn in late hours. Indeed, as reported in interviews,
strong wind makes very di cult to control fires in pastures. Increasing the size of
annual plots increase the needs for firebreaks and alert neighbors, on the other side
burning in the late hours of the day is not practiced. This may reflect two di↵erent
ways to burn: in pastures firebreaks are less e↵ective, and even if wind is low,
weeds burn. Moreover, since pastures are often large, neighbors control is more
di cult. This is the opposite of what happens in annual crop plots, which are
smaller, and firebreaks as well as human supervision is more e↵ective. Moreover
since larger logs need to be burnt, but flames are likely to be smaller, farmer are
used to burn in windy hours.
Perennial crops are rare, and plots are small (see Table 4.2), however when
perennial crops increase farmers are more likely to control fire in pasture and roc¸a,
implementing more firebreaks and burning in colder hours.
It can be argued that important e↵ects related to exogenous fire risk are
omitted from this model. Indeed the survey has been carried on in two far
Municiaplities (Santarem and Paragominas) for which exogenous risk, especially
related to climatic conditions may variate. We couldn’t include that dummy in
the model because of high collinearity with prices. Indeed as shown in Table 4.5,
7 Appendix C provide estimates results using the logarithm of n fcm
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almost all of the variance in Paragominas dummy is explained by prices.
Table 4.5: Probit estimation of Paragominas (0/1)
Variable Coe cient (Std. Err.)
manioc flour price -10.761⇤⇤⇤ (2.164)
Victim of external fire accident? 0.262 (0.887)
Intercept 10.032⇤⇤⇤ (2.233)
N 222
Pseudo R2 0.939
 2(3)p-value 0.0000
Percent of dependent variable
correctly predicted 99.55%
Significance levels : ⇤ : 10% ⇤⇤ : 5% ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ : 1%
4.3.4. Discussion and conclusion
Including variables of social capital and trust we found di↵erent estimates from
those by Bowman et al. (2008). The intensity of investments in firebreaks is
especially determined by social capital and neighbors trust (Table 4.4). The size
of the annual plot and the demographic feature of the household are significant
(see also Appendix C), but prices are not significant.
Fire management training has little or no e↵ect on the decision to set fire
control measures. The e↵ect of land use and landscape type reflects technical
parameters involving the e cacy of fire prevention measure relatively to land use
and landscape flammability. Indeed these variables a↵ect the decision to engage
in fire control measures, but have little or no e↵ect on the intensity of fire control.
Variables concerning social capital and trust are likely to positively a↵ect the
decision to engage in fire control measures, and the intensity of fire control. Other
studies are not conclusive on this (Carmenta et al., 2013; Simmons et al., 2002),
perhaps because of a mis-specification of variables due to the di culty to indentify
the right level in which collective action takes place. As we shown both social
capital proxies at the community level as well as in neighborhood level are often
significant. This support the thesis that interdependency in fire control exist, and
that insu cient incentives to control fire may come not only from excessive costs
or lack of knowledge (as in Nepstad et al., 1999 or Carmenta 2013), but from a
collective action failure at the local level.
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Chapter 5
Eliciting mental models: is
collective action perceived as an
option by farmers?
5.1. Introduction
In previous Chapters we have discussed the relevance of collective action in
the decision to control fire, the factors that may obstacle its likelihood and the
importance of institutional arrangements. We have also noticed the importance of
situational framing in determining whether it is worth or not to set up fire control
measures.
With the increased occurrence of accidental fires (Sorrensen, 2009), the per-
ception of the need to control fire may be changing and may eventually lead to
new rules and norms (Brondizio and Moran, 2008).
In this Chapter we deepen the role of framing and in particular of actor’s
mental models with respect to fire issues. How do perceptions about risks and
of norms about fire control and firefight a↵ect perceptions about governance
preferences, fire use or a transition out of fire use? Is collective action indeed
perceived as an option by farmers, or is controlling fires seen only as a government
task? How may policies for collective action deal with those preferences?
To address this question we sketch a framework based on Denzau and North’s
(1994) mental models and Bromley (2006) concept of Volitional Pragmatism.
Moreover we discuss the potential benefit of approaching collective action through
mental models. Then we apply a socio-psychology method named Q methodology
to elicit farmers’ mental models, and we test three hypotheses about mental
models heterogeneity. In the end we discuss results and the implication for policies
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for collective action.
5.2. Theoretical framework, context of the study
and methodology
5.2.1. Actors’ risk framing and collective action
Risk and uncertainty linked to fire, when addressed from a collective action
perspective, imply several particularities. Rational choice theory considers that
failure or success of collective action depends on how an individual rationally infer
the costs and the benefit of engaging in this action (Coleman and Coleman, 1994;
Olson, 1965). But when individuals face a situation distinguished by structural
uncertainty such as risk mitigation, actors’ capacity to infer outcomes from past
actions is seriously challenged. The certainty of future benefit and the ability
to provide local enforcement are important factors influencing the success of
collective action (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001). Trust is often seen as the main tool
to defeat structural uncertainty, but developing trust depends on a costly process
(Dasgupta, 1988; Ostrom, 2000) involving beliefs and institutions (Bromley, 2006;
North, 2005). External governance (either in terms of provision of information or
of monitoring and control activities) can thus be important to build institutions
that favor engagement of actors in risk control, by suggesting rules which reduce
uncertainty and o↵er a frame for outcome predictability, favoring trust relations
(Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001; Dasgupta, 1988).
The di culty in assessing risk leads to a wide variety of perceptions regarding
the possible e↵ectiveness of practices and thus of the outcome of collective action
(O’Connor et al., 1999). Gruev-Vintila and Rouquette (2007) show that risk-
prone behaviour depends on personal involvement in risk, which is influenced
by the perceived magnitude of the risk, personal exposure to risk and perceived
capacity to mitigate risk. In cases where risk is endogenous to a group (i.e. the
neighborhood), the higher the personal involvement, the more certain the collective
action solution, and the lower the perceived magnitude of risk. Conversely, the
more risk is perceived as exogenous to the reference group (i.e. external to
the neighborhood), the lower the personal involvement in risk control and the
perceived likelihood of collective action. The perception of risk thus seems to have
a great influence on the possible engagement of an individual in collective action.
Increased perceptions of fire risk are likely to increase the costs of organization,
especially if involvement in risk is low. Understanding actors’ attitude to risk is
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crucial when defining the appropriate governance setting.
Mental models have been increasingly used as a conceptual framework to
analyse actors’ cognitive frames, norms and collective action for natural resource
management (Jones et al., 2011; Lynam et al., 2012; Eisawah et al. 2013, Wolfe
(2012) and Boschetti et al. (2012)). Mental models are made up of experience
and culture (Denzau and North, 1994); they are the joint product of rule-based
stable thinking and ephemeral knowledge (Jones et al., 2011); and they are fed
by empirical information through abductive learning (Hodgson, 1993). Actors’
mental models shape how actors perceive the payo↵s of collective action and thus
the expected benefits to engage in it (Denzau and North, 1994). Mental models
also influence the form of institutional structures and the emergence of norms:
‘Mental models are the internal representations that individual cogni-
tive systems create to interpret the environment; institutions are the
external (to the mind) mechanisms individuals create to structure and
order the environment’ (North, 1994).
In North’s works, however, it is not clear how a consensual mental model is
formed and selected to choose an institutional solution (Schlu¨ter, 2009). Bromley’s
su cient reason framework provides a solution to this problem as it links individual
agency and collective action (Schlu¨ter, 2009).
In Bromley’s view (2006; 1989), to find a solution to a problem characterized
by structural uncertainty, the actors must have a su cient reason to change,
and engage in the collective action process that culminates in choosing among
competing solutions and norms. The construction of arguments leading to a
su cient reason not only depends on cognitive models (Denzau and North, 1994)
but also on normative ones. Cognitive models comprise settled and warranted
beliefs. Settled beliefs are based on experience and previously used patterns,
while warranted beliefs rely on knowledge provided by authority, experts, science
and the media the actor considers to be reliable. Normative models consist in
valuable beliefs based on personal values, the volitional premises to change. Both
normative and cognitive models follow an abductive updating process and depend
on communication with other individuals (Bromley, 2008). Bromley’s concepts of
su cient reason and volitional pragmatism bring us back to individual agency and
make it possible to open the black box of how individual reasons lead to choose
the institutional settings (Bromley and Cernea, 1989; Schlu¨ter, 2009).
The importance of shared mental model (actually low heterogeneity of per-
ceptions and a common knowledge of the resource) has been acknowledged in
collective action theory as reducing social uncertainty increasing incentives to
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cooperate (Jorgerson and Papciak 1981), and reducing the perceived cost of or-
ganization (Ostrom 2009, Olson 1956, Heckathorn 1993). In other word before
deciding whether to cooperate or not, actors need to identify the problem, a
set of solutions and agree that cooperation can be a solution, holding a similar
representation of the situation (Simon and March 1958). Metha et al. (1999) proof
this to be key for actors social and institutional positioning. While heterogeneity
on normative issues linked to di↵erences in identity and interests have already
been addressed (Baland and Plateau 1999) studying collective action by mental
models open the road to individuate a further class of conditions for a successful
collective action related to the cognitive component of mental models.
Recent studies on mental models concentrated on identifying the origin of
mental models and the methods to elicit them (Jones et al. 2011). We believe
there are useful complementarities in bridging collective action and mental models
studies. This complementary approach has more explanatory power as social and
environmental uncertainty became more relevant for collective action. We tested
the hypothesis that consensus exist across mental models, at least on a set of issues
(Hp1) and that farmers share mainly the same set of normative and cognitive
model. (Hp2). In the end we used Bromley’s framework to explore farmers’
mental models, to understand what arguments they have built in relation to fire
risk and fire control; to what extent the reasons they carry on may make them
defeat structural uncertainty (Bromley, 2008), create (or not) endogenous e↵ective
institutions to mitigate fire risk through collective action, and how policies could
support collective action as a solution to the fire control dilemma. In particular
we looked if regularity exists between perceived fire risk, risk involvement and
a preference for collective action (Hp3). Indeed, increasing perceived fire risk is
likely to increase the costs of organization, especially if involvement in risk is low.
5.2.2. Context of the study
We sampled 16 communities in two neighboring municipalities, Paragominas and
Ipixuna do Para´, both located in the post-frontier region of Para´ state. Those
two municipalities embrace di↵erent landscape type and a number of traditional
as well as recent communities. Moreover, in recent years, the two municipalities
applied opposite policies against fires (see Chapter 2).
During a two-month field study in 2013, we visited 16 communities of these
two municipalities in both traditional riverside areas (n=4) and in more recent
land reform settlements (n=12).
See Chapter 3 for a further description of the context of the study.
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Table 5.1: The communities involved
Region Characteristics # Communities # Interviews
Paragonorte Land reform settlement 4 23
Degraded pasture
Mandacaru Land reform settlement 1 2
Pasture
Capim Riverside communities 4 9
Dominated by forest
Luiz Inacio Land reform settlement 3 11
Dominated by forest
Ipixuna Land reform settlements 4 10
(around Gleba 13) Mixed, dominated by pastures
5.2.3. Data collection and analysis
In order to assess mental models regarding fire use and control, we interviewed
key actors identified with the help of community leaders and local organizations
among the farmers who hold a key position with respect to fire issues, either for
organizational or geographical reasons. Key actors included for example innovator
or entrepreneurial farmers, producers who had su↵ered serious damage caused by
fires, or who used original strategies to control fires. Conducting interviews on
fire accidents was challenging; the fire issue is taboo as it is a latent source of
conflicts in the communities. Some farmers even told us that the interview was
the first time they had spoken out loud about fires. For this reason, we combined
a semi-structured interview to gather general information on the respondents,
their farms and on how fire was managed at the community or neighborhood level,
with a socio-psychology method named Q methodology, to reveal mental models.
Q methodology was born from the work of Stephenson (1935) in psychology;
it was popularized in political science by Brown (1980) and used in various other
social sciences including environmental policy and economics (Baker et al., 2006;
Barry and Proops, 1999; Ockwell, 2008). Data collection consists in asking the
interviewee to rank statements in a constrained quasi normal score distribution
(Table 5.2), and to comment the resulting patch. This enables the respondent to
take a position even on uncomfortable issues, taking advantage of the constrained
distribution of the scores to be allocated among statements. As far as the author
know Q methodology has not yet been used to study mental models however
we believe it can fit this purpose, especially relating to uncomfortable or taboo
issues. Even if respondents had to give a representation of their thoughts through
a limited number of statements, they had the opportunity to explain their choices
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and further detail of their understanding in the semistructured interview. Indeed
Q methodology fit the requirements for a direct elicitation method as classified by
Jones et al. (2011)
A cross-correlation matrix of all sorts (individual mental models) is then
factored to distinguish the main shared mental models (SMMs) among respondents
(see for instance (Davies and Hodge, 2007; Ockwell, 2008).
Table 5.2: Constraint table used to rank the opinion statements
0
-1 0 1
-1 0 1
-2 -1 0 1 2
-2 -1 0 1 2
Strongly disagrees Disagrees Neither agrees Agrees Strongly agrees
nor disagrees
We applied the Q methodology individually using a game board and cards
(Table 5.1), as this interactive tool helps gain the confidence of smallholders and
results in more answers than would be possible with a questionnaire. The 55
respondents were asked to rank 17 statements on a 5-steps scale The selection of
statements was based on existing literature and previous interviews and group
work in the Paragominas communities already carried out. We selected statements
concerning normative and cognitive models about slash and burn and the risk
of fire spread, the norms applying to fire control, fire fighting and fire use in
the neighborhood. These statements also concerned perceptions related to the
governance level at which fire should be controlled (individual, community or
government action). We deal with a sample characterized by a low literacy level:
despite the use of an interactive set, with a board and cards, the test was generally
administered orally, needing on average half an hour. In four cases the interviewees
were not able to accomplish the test and were dropped from the sample. Barry and
Proops (1999) suggest an optimal selection of 36 statements, but we had to reduce
it to 17 to reduce the time needed to accomplish the test. Some statements were
dropped and some others were connected to not omit important representations.
Q methodology does not require perfect independence between statements, and
we tried to mix up statements following farmers common sense. Indeed statements
were tested and adapted to ensure optimal comprehension by the respondents.
Data from the Q methodology was analysed following the procedure described
in Brown (1980), which enabled to distinguish SMMs, seen as a particular com-
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Figure 5.1: A farmer accomplishing a Q test
bination of agreements and disagreements regarding the statements. A Q sort
(individual mental models) cross-correlation matrix was factored using the prin-
cipal component method; a varimax rotation was applied since no reasonable
criterion to legitimize a judgemental rotation was found. Four groups were indi-
viduated by three criteria: eigenvalue had to be greater than one, a minimum
of 4 sorts had to load significantly on each factor, and at least five distinguished
statements had to emerge in order to guarantee interpretability (see Table 5.3).
Sort significance was set at 1% in order to load only the sorts that really described
the factor. Factor scores were obtained averaging the Q sorts belonging to the
factor utilizing the weight f/(1  f 2), where f is the factor loading. Significant
statements are individuated testing non-zero di↵erences among each factor score.
Other technical details are reported in Appendix C. Hypothesis 1 is refuted for
a certain statement if the statement is not significant on any factor, or signs
di↵er. Hypothesis 2 is tested computing the eigen value ratio between two sequent
factors. If the eigen value ratio is higher than 3 we can assume a good degree of
consensus on the first factor (Stone–Jovicich et al. 2011). Statistics of farmers
features whose sort loaded significantly on each factors were also computed to
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reveal the possible explanation of farmers SMM’s. The link between the features
of respondent loading on a SMM and the corresponding factor does not allow
any inductive generalization, especially due to the limited size of the sample used
in this study. Nevertheless, if strongly supported by other data on participant
observations and semi-structured interviews, complementary statistics can be used
to adduce explanation to the SMM. Since independence holds among factors,
the SMM identified through the Q-methodology by this sample have statistical
validity (Barry and Proops, 1999; Brown, 1980). Many studies on the elicitation
of mental models use consensus analysis (Jones et al., 2011), and assume that
factors identified in the sample represent all the relevant SMMs in the action
arena (Stone-Jovicich et al., 2011). With Q methodology, instead, other relevant
latent SMMs may exist, but the validity of the identified factors is not influenced
by the sample size (Brown, 1980).
5.3. Results
The Q-test (Table 5.3) enabled the identification of four main SMMs, held by 34
farmers (out of the 55 interviewed)1 . Table 5.4 characterizes the farmers loading
on each SMM with features relating to region, farming system, experience of fire
accidents, and social involvement.
5.3.1. Mental models elicitation
SMM A: Eager to shift to alternative techniques
SMM A, endorsed by 14 farmers, expresses the point of view of farmers willing
to engage in a transition away from the use of fire (S3). Fire is no longer the
only way to produce (S1) and is probably not the best way (S2). Burning is no
1 34 sorts (individuals) loaded significantly on 4 factors (SMMs), accounting for 55% of
total variance. In Table 5.3 values for each sentence correspond to the standardized mean
value of the score given by the individuals loading on this factor. Answers can range from -2
to 2 (ordinal), -2 indicating major disagreement, -1 relative disagreement, 0 neither agree nor
disagree, -1 relative agreement and +2 major agreement. Thus, for statement 9, the Table
reads: ‘SMM A strongly agrees, SMM B mildly disagrees, SMM C relatively strongly disagrees
and SMM D relatively agrees.’ Asterisks reflect distinction between statements among factors
(⇤p < 0.1; ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05; ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01). A statement is considered to be distinct within a factor
if the corresponding parameter is significantly di↵erent from the parameters corresponding to
the same statement on all the other factors. For any single statement, standardized z-scores
between two factors are significantly di↵erent if their di↵erence is greater than z*SED. SED is
the standard error of di↵erences, which is a single value for each pair of factors (Brown, 1980).
For instance, for sentence 9, all SMMs are significantly distinguished; for sentence 10, only SMM
A is distinct from other SMMs.
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longer the farmers’ right (S11), and these respondents insist that their neighbors
should stop using fire (S9). They perceive fire risk as being high (S4, S6) but fire
prevention measures as being reliable (S5). Fire control is a moral obligation and
not just an individual choice (S12). For this reason, there is a preference for the
enforcement of rules: the community has an important role to play (S13), but
maybe because of a low level of cooperation in the neighborhood (S7), government
intervention is considered to be indispensable to solve the fire control problem
(S14). Firefighting is not perceived as being as useful (S16), and these farmers are
generally not involved (S17).
This SMM is most representative of the farmers in ‘traditional’ riverside
communities (Table 5.4), who live in the best conserved areas. This may seem
surprising, as despite their traditional origins they show a high degree of willingness
to engage in an agricultural transition. New technologies are quite attractive to
these farmers, as they learn about tractors and other alternative techniques on
the television, radio and through assistance from technicians, but in practice, have
little access to them. Those farmer present a high level of involvement in risk:
they su↵ered damage from fires which mainly escaped from neighboring properties
(Table 5.4), which is logical given the low probability of contagion from afar in
the still relatively preserved forests. For the same reason they perceive that fire
control measures can be reliable (S5). Moreover the magnitude of losses is for
them higher than for farmers loading on other factors (Table 5.4).
SMM B: Favorable to fire use but perceives a high fire risk
SMM B is oriented towards traditional fire use: fire is a good way to produce, but
it has to be controlled (S2), building firebreaks is a moral duty (S12), although
they are not really a reliable prevention measure (S5). In SMM B, perception of
fire risk is by far the highest of all the SMMs (S4, S6). Indeed, 83% of these farmers
have experienced accidents caused by fire originating outside their neighborhood
(Table 5.4). Most farmers grouped under SMM B come from the land reform
settlements with degraded pasture. Open pastures are highly inflammable and
can carry fire over several dozen kilometres. These respondents declare that if
there were no fire risk, they would plant profitable perennial crops, but given the
context, they prefer continue swidden culture using fire.
This perception of a serious threat of uncontrollable fires may explain one
of the most distinguishing features of SMM B. This SMM does not show beliefs
in community control (S13). These farmers are thus in favor and in some sense
dependent on external help, government intervention being viewed as the only
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solution to the fire problem (S14). According to this SMM, few or no cooperative
activities are undertaken in the neighborhood (S7, S8) and these farmers report
a low level of satisfaction concerning communication about fire control within
the community (S10). They do wish there were more collective participation in
firefighting, especially in emergency cases (S15). Fire is thus seen as an exogenous
risk against which the community needs to act to limit possible destruction, this
mental model show a little involvement in risk, at least in fire prevention.
SMM C: Favorable to fire use because it is under control
Although SMM C acknowledges that slash and burn is not the only available
production technique (S1), it shows strong preferences for fire use and fire control
(S12). Fire use is a right, and nobody has the right to forbid it (S11), there is
no legitimate reason to ask the neighbor to stop using fire (S9). Interestingly,
71% of these farmers have tried to mechanize at least once; mechanization is a
well-known alternative, but fire is still preferred.
Although fire accidents are felt as a threat (S4), they do not appear to be
a serious preoccupation (S6). One possible explanation is the good cooperation
between neighbors (S7), which reduces the fire risk in the neighborhood. SMM C
stresses the importance of enforcement via fire prevention rules. Moreover since
they experienced mainly fire accidents in the neighborhood, SMM C shows a high
level of involvement in risk
The farmers in this SMM have almost all been trained in fire control in
the past and all have already discussed fire during community meetings. This
background may explain the higher level of cooperation (S7), the strength of the
moral norm toward fire control (S12) and the view of the government as a partner
(S14). Almost half of the respondents are from the municipality of Ipixuna do
Para´ where government action is stronger, and a third are from the recent land
settlement Luiz Inacio, where technical assistance from Paragominas municipality
has been concentrated in recent years. According to this SMM, collective action
is an e cient way to control fire, and if the risk is under control, slash-and-burn
is considered a better technique than other agricultural alternatives they have
experimented.
SMM D: Turns to collective control or exit farming in the absence of
external support
According to SMM D, fire is not the right way to produce (S2) and neighbors
should stop using fire (S9), but a shift away from slash and burn is not ranked as
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an absolute priority (S3). The attitude of SMM D towards risk is questioning:
although all respondents have experienced serious damage due to fire spread in the
past, SMM D shows no fear of fire accidents and the farmers consider themselves
to be protected against future events (S5). Although most fires experienced by
these farmers originated outside the neighborhood, this SMM considers that the
community has an important role to play (S13). The need for cooperation in
firefight is the most popular statement (S16), but there is no real confidence that
the others will help (S15); the respondents acknowledge that they themselves do
not cooperate in firefights (S17). This SMM can be distinguished from the others
because the call for external help is significantly lower (S14).
In fact, all these farmers have been seriously damaged in the past and now
appear to be disappointed; 75% of them have a pessimistic view of the future
of the community (Table 5.4). They appear to have been marginalized from
social dynamics regarding fire, as only one out of four respondents that load on
this factor has received fire training in the past five years and none of them has
discussed fire in community meetings. This attitude may have personal reasons,
as three out of four do not depend on their agricultural activity: three of them
have a retirement pension and the fourth has started a commercial activity on the
side. But they are also all from the land settlements in Paragominas and report
they are disappointed with government intervention. Thus, it seems that these
farmers believe in community measures because they place no hope in external
support. But when they had the opportunity they adopted an exit strategy,
reducing reliance on agricultural income. Indeed they are no more involved in
risk.
5.3.2. Do farmers share a common mental model?
Hypothesis 1: Consensus exists across SMMs, at least on a set of issues
All statements are significant on at least one SMM, indicating that there is high
heterogeneity of thinking either on normative and cognitive models. Hypothesis
one thus is largely refuted. All SMMs pointed out that fire is not the only possible
technique (S1), however SMM B shows lower disagreement.
All SMMs di↵er in opinion about the goodness of controlled fire as an agri-
cultural technique (S2), but with the visible exception of SMM A, they do not
call for a change in practices. Statements 9 and 11 reveal high divergences in
cognitive models about fire use, either in moral norms as in neighborhood norms,
suggesting that conflicts for fire use are likely to occur.
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With respect to fire control we found higher homogeneity of thinking, at least
on normative statements such as the moral obligation to build firebreaks (S12),
and other institutional measures of fire control (S7, S8). However all the SMMs
evidence that fire is little or not at all discussed within the community (S10).
Although all producers perceive fire as a threat (S4 has always strong negative
sign), and there is homogeneous uncertainty about fire risk (S5), there is a high
disagreement regarding the destructive power of fire (S6).
Expected participation in firefight by respondents and the other members of
the community is a debated issue (S15, S17), but, with the exception of SMM C,
there is no normative model operating for cooperation in firefight (S 16).
Normative statements calling for enforcement of fire control rules often had
homogeneous high agreement scores. Despite A, all SMMs stressed the fact
that the community has a role to play in controlling fire (S13). But, with the
exception of SMMD, government intervention obtained even higher scores, external
enforcement being considered as a necessary condition to control fire (S14).
Hypothesis 2: Farmers share the same set of normative and cognitive
model
Despite there is no consensus across mental model on any specific issue, it can be
that one mental model is mode representative of the sample, and that consensus
converge on it. Indeed the eigenvalue-ratio between factor A and B is 2.58,
close to 3, the threshold aknowledged to display consensus over the first factor
(Stone–Jovicich et al. 2011). Moreover most presidents of local associations hold
this mental model (Table 5.4), and since leaders of associations are always elected,
their opinion is therefore representative of many farmers in their communities.
Hypothesis 2 is rejected, but a certain degree of homogeneity exists in the sample
with respect to the first mental model. According to this SMM, therefore, there is
a generalized demand for external enforcement of fire control rules to reduce fire
risk and eventually enable a shift to alternative solutions.
However it should be noticed that this result highly depend on the sample,
and that this is not a representative one.
Hypothesis 3: Regularity exists between perceived fire risk, risk in-
volvement and a preference for collective action
To understand how perceptions of fire risk, governance preference and risk involve-
ment, link the four SMMs we resume them in Table 5.5. Perceptions of fire risk
oppose those who feel that there is a high risk of fire accidents (A B) and those
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who feel fire is under control (C D). Risk involvement opposes those who are
ready to adopt risk prone behaviour (A C), and those who lack involvement (B
D).
Table 5.5: Risk involvement (§), perception of fire risk (†) and governance
preference (‡)
Involvement in risk High Low
Perception of risk
Low C D
complementary solutions (fire control) exit
High A B
complementary solutions (transition) hierarchical external governance
(§) involvement in risk is discussed in the previous section. (†) perception of fire risk is based on
S4, S5, S6. (‡) perception of governance preference is based on S13, S14.
This di↵erentiation corresponds to di↵erent preferences regarding the type
of governance that leads to better control of fire. SMM D represents those
who implemented an exit strategy, SMM B is unable to deal with risk, and call
for a hierarchical solution. By opposite SMM C and A are more favorable to
complementary governmental and internal community control. However we must
take into account the opposite scores of normative statements about fire use that
characterize those models. While type A is likely to undertake collective action to
leverage external resources to exit fire (i.e. lobby toward the local governmental
organizations and the Institute for the Agrarian Reform) the second is likely
to undertake collective action for fire control. Indeed none of the farmers from
Ipixuna, particularly represented in this SMM, recalls fire accidents during the
two years of the program. Instead, they reported in interviews several episodes of
monitoring and sanctioning among neighbors. In the words of Seu Felisardo:
‘Since two years there are no more accidents, now everybody require
a license [. . . ]. Three others and I went to check [in the neighboring
properties], and we found that he [the neighbor] had not made a meter
of firebreaks! We peek at him to be able to control fire anyhow [. . . ].
Before the law [the license] nobody was building firebreaks!’
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5.4. Discussion and implications for collective
action
The literature stresses the importance of landscape features in defining fire risk
(Cochrane, 2003; Nepstad et al., 1999), but the capacity to adapt and develop
e↵ective fire control heavily influence fire risk perceptions at the local level. A
certain degree of cooperation may takes place within neighborhoods to avoid fire
spread among nearby properties, but the outcome of local collective action is
threatened by large-scale fires caused by the lack of control over external areas.
This is particularly true in highly flammable landscapes dominated by pastures
and degraded forest. This point appears clearly in our study: when farmers
are used to experiencing fires which originate outside their neighborhood they
start accepting the phenomenon as a natural and ineluctable one, since every
fire control measure they set up on their property or within the neighborhood
turns out to be useless (Cammelli and Coudel, 2013). When fire risk does seem to
be uncontrollable, people are less involved in risk (Gruev-Vintila and Rouquette
2007) and less likely to show fire-prone behaviour (Pe´gard, 2010; Winter and
Fried, 2000). SMM B has the highest perception of fire risk, and has the least
confidence in collective action, as fires are perceived as being ineluctable.
Risk thus appears to represent the upper bound for collective action. When
fire risk is high and involvement is low, cooperation is less likely since the expected
benefits of collective action are reduced. Personal exposure to risk increases, but
the perceived capacity to mitigate risk decreases significantly, leading risk to be
considered as natural and ineluctable. Consequently social norms to control fire
risk are less likely to emerge. This mechanism operates at a cognitive level but
does not appear to a↵ect normative models about the future: although SMMs
A and B both have a high risk perception, their evaluative beliefs regarding fire
use are quite di↵erent. Opinions about fire use relate to a more complex set of
explanations.
The di↵erent perceptions of fire risk and fire controllability lead to di↵erent
preferences regarding the governance required to encourage fire control. SMM
B does not believe in the e↵ectiveness of endogenous control because fire risk is
exogenous to the neighborhood, and thus prefers external control. SMM C believes
in local social control, but has received support from external institutions. In
SMM D, trust in community control emerged in response to a cognitive dissonance
originating in the absence of external support. Although we had expected to find
marked di↵erences between traditional communities and land reform settlements,
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in practice there is no clear cut distinction. It is noteworthy that apart from
farmers loading on SMMs A and C, which mainly represent traditional riverside
communities and Ipixuna farmers, the other SMMs are mixed within the same area.
This can be explained by di↵erences in personal and collective experience of fire
(Brondizio and Moran, 2008) or in neighborhood dynamics, but may also reveal
di↵erences in accessing policies. The success of a policy to encourage collective
action critically depends on the creation of a shared mental model (Jones et al.,
2011; Stone-Jovicich et al., 2011) and thus on a universal policy access. Because of
the perception of risk linked to actor’s decisions, an e↵ective policy for fire control
must take into account di culties in policy delivery: not only is social brokerage
important (de Sardan, 1995), but a good understanding of mental models may be
the key to e↵ective risk communication (Morgan et al., 2001).
5.4.1. Mental models collective action and policy
The link between governance preferences and perceived fire risk opens considerable
scope for policy interventions aimed at legitimizing endogenous fire control, by
creating awareness of the factors that influence controllability of fire risk and
encourage fire-prone behaviours.
Trust cannot be taken for granted in economic and social behaviour; its pro-
duction depends on institutions, and it plays a key role in ensuring predictability
(Dasgupta, 1988). With a reduced budget, Ipixuna’s fire prevention programme
seems to have been e↵ective in restoring trust in fire manageability within neigh-
borhoods (Cammelli and Coudel, 2013). A combined action of fire prevention
training, improved access to the licensing system, arbitration between neighbors
and a few sanctions at the municipal scale made it possible to reduce the expected
risk of fire from other neighborhoods, and to legitimize internal sanctions (Cam-
melli and Coudel, 2013). The example of Ipixuna (SMM C) suggests how risk
reduction can be e↵ective in creating shared mental models for collective action,
and that perception of risk can be reduced by increasing trust in cooperation
and legitimizing local sanctioning even with very few penalizing activities. Some
external sanctioning contributes to start the trust building process, but the final
e↵ect on fire control cooperation cannot be attributed to external sanctioning
alone. The main role of external sanctions is rather to provide a further argument
to reach a su cient reason to create a social norm for fire control: external
sanctions do not only have a deterrent e↵ect and increase the application of
rules, they also legitimize local sanctioners to operate within the community and,
through abductive learning, establish a horizon of predictability of outcomes over
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collective action (Ostrom, 2000). All farmers from Ipixuna reported that they
were certain that everybody was now controlling fire for fear of sanctions; but only
one smallholder had been fined in the two preceding years. Such a compliance
to the law can’t be explained by such a low enforcement activity. Instead, a
collective action surge within Ipixuna’s communities appears to be a more likely
explanation.
5.5. Conclusion
Mental models have both a cognitive and a normative component (Schluter 2009),
but literature on collective action has paid little attention to the cognitive side of
mental models, stressing the importance of homogeneity of identity and interests
(Baland and Plateau, 1999; Agrawal, 2002). Mental models not only shape the
payo↵s to engage in collective action (Denzau and North 1994), they are the
cognitive tools of actors such as understanding how the problem and the set
of solutions are framed, and this is key for the collective action process in an
uncertain environment. Addressing collective action likelihood by mental models
adds a further class of conditions for a successful collective action related to the
cognitive component of mental models. Those conditions are contingent to the
case of study but are also inescapable to understand the local collective action
process. Castillo et al., (2011) found that actors’ decisions in field experiments on
common-pool-resources crucially depend on their previous experience and context.
We believe that eliciting and analysing actors mental models contribute explaining
how this process occur.
Faced with the taboo surrounding fire, we chose to apply the Q methodology
to elicit farmers’ mental models and to analyse whether or not collective action is
perceived as a way to mitigate fire risk. Current fire control policies do not address
the fire control dilemma; revealing mental models through Q methodology helped
thinking about which policy orientation could favor a surge in collective action,
and overcome the problem of lack of appropriation of fire control policies by the
farmers. SMMs identified with the Q-test revealed substantial heterogeneity of
views about fire use, fire risk, and norms about fire prevention and control, but
consistent beliefs that fire control is essential. This suggests that clear control
norms have not yet emerged and that there are competing logics: the fire control
problem clearly has many configurations, and behaviours follow di↵erent patterns.
Our results suggest that a high perceived risk of fire and a low risk involvement
limits collective action for fire control. Reducing risk perception may be an
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e↵ective way to achieve collective action.
Perceptions of risk depend on landscape features and the technical capacities
to control fires, perceptions of coordination within and between neighborhoods,
and external enforcement. While current government intervention concentrated
only on the first issue, an e↵ective policy aimed at encouraging engagement in fire
control cannot ignore any of these three aspects. An institutional solution that
reduces perceived fire risk and establishes clear rules for fire control could support
trust building and favor collective action within and among neighborhoods. We
thus believe there is an important avenue to explore how public policies can better
encourage and support local collective action dynamics for fire control. On the
other side a shift away from slash and burn is not always seen by farmers as a
solution, and its acceptance cannot be taken for granted.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
In this section we briefly summarize the problem we focused upon, we synthesize
the key challenges and key findings of the study. Finally we highlight some policy
implications and the need for further research.
6.1. Synthesis of the problem
While deforestation has rapidly slowed down in the Brazilian Amazon, hotspots
are increasing also in areas of reduced deforestation, indicating that accidental
fires are probably increasing (Araga˜o and Shimabukuro, 2010).
Fire use is an e↵ective technique largely used to clear land for annual crops and
to open and regenerate pastures. However fires for agricultural purpose generate
a multiplicity of ignition sources that may lead to large accidental fires, with
high damages to ecosystem services (including carbon stocks) and to assets and
infrastructures on the properties.
Since many externalities arise in fire management we argue that lack of fire
control is essentially driven by a collective action failure.
Studying collective action for fire control is challenging because, due to the
disruptive e↵ects of fires, fire accidents have become a taboo issue. Farmers are
likely to over report fire control and cooperation is rarely observable. Moreover a
clear methodological and theoretical framework to study collective action has not
yet been established.
We adopted a mixed method triangulation approach combining in depth semi-
structured interviews and the Q methodology to study farmers’ mental models,
with an econometric analysis of the determinants of fire control.
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6.2. Key findings across di↵erent methods and
di↵erent levels
We found that three main levels are highly concerned in the choice to control fire:
the neighborhood, the community and the municipality.
6.2.1. How do neighbors a↵ect fire management choices?
In section 4.2.2 we modeled the interdependency that originates from fire manage-
ment. We showed that multiple equilibria may exist, and that although farmers
may prefer equilibria with high level of labor devoted to fire control, they may get
stuck in low level equilibria with high fire risk and low investments in fire control
measures. Q methodology highlights that this is likely to happen when most of
fire risk is exogenous to the neighborhood, reducing risk involvement.
In section 4.2.4 we highlighted some of the factors that a↵ect the optimal deci-
sion to allocate labor to fire prevention measures at the household level. Estimates
in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show how neighbors trust is an important predictor of the
decision to engage in fire control, and especially of the amount of labor allocated
to firebreaks clearing and the number of fire control measures implemented.
This finding confirms the observation reported in Chapter 3 that the neigh-
borhood is the natural dimension in which decisions related to fire control are
made. neighbors indeed are likely to a↵ect fire risk in a highly significant way: we
observed several forms of agreement on rules and even a case of Coasean bargain
to improve fire control in a neighboring property.
6.2.2. How do the community a↵ect fire management
choices?
Not only neighbors, but also the community plays a key role. When landscape is
highly flammable, community institutions may provide rules to reduce fire risk,
increasing the benefits of investing in fire control measures. Even more important,
communities play a crucial role in determining perceptions about fire control and
whether farmers feels themselves or not responsible for mitigating fire risk.
Communities are important institutions favoring the reproduction of social
capital, creating occasions of face-to-face communication and improving leadership.
All those functions are key in a context in which farms are spread over a large
area as are farms in the Brazilian Amazon. Within the community we observed
several reciprocity practices in production and consumption, which are key in
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trust building. Only during religious rites and association activities farmers have
the opportunity to talk in front of most of the members of the community, discuss
issues and sanction deviant behaviours. Estimates results show that participation
in church activities or in associations has a positive and significant e↵ect on
implementing four fire control measures and on the time allocated to firebreaks
clearing.
Community provides also many linkages with the urban world and the govern-
mental institutions. Indeed local associations intermediate all forms of govern-
mental programs and subsidies.
As shown in Chapter 3 and 4, increasing fire risk may lead to a low level
equilibrium in which farmers cope with risk through planting non fire sensitive
crops instead of investing in mitigating fire risk. This is a problem for those
farmers willing to undertake a transition out of fire use since the investments risk
increases.
Although community institutions provide useful coordination mechanisms
for fire control and fire fighting many farmers express concern in interviews
for the degradation of those institutions, in particular with respect to the role
of associations that are becoming outpost of governmental bureaucracy. Many
community leaders interpret their role as lobbyist in front of governmental agencies
and neglect their role within the community.
Few farmers reported clear perceptions of rules in fire management within the
community. Most of farmers underline monitoring and sanctioning di culties,
sanctioner’s loss of legitimacy and the absence of mechanisms to manage fire
conflicts and getting compensations from fire damages. In many of the communities
visited in Paragominas fires were actually a taboo issue.
6.2.3. How do local and municipal policies a↵ect fire man-
agement choices?
Attending a fire control training shows little or no correlation with the actual
adoption of fire control measures and the intensity of fire control (Tables 4.3
and 4.4). Farmers are sometimes unsatisfied from training courses, the technique
proposed and the style of controls (Chapter 3). However, both in Q methodology
and semi-structured interviews, most of farmers prioritize an external intervention
establishing rules for fire control and sanctioning deviant behaviors. Why is there
such a contrast between the way government has always oriented fire trainings
and the farmers demand for it?
Literature and fire prevention campaigns have always stressed the need for
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new techniques and for education on ‘good’ fire management practices (Costa,
2004). We argue that farmers probably know the ‘good’ technique, but they have
insu cient incentives to implement it if other farmers don’t do the same. It is
a trust building issue and coordination failure problem. For example in Ipixuna
the solution was a fire prevention program including some training as well as
some sanctions and extensive use of conflict management. Moreover the program
reduced the cost of compliance by making possible to get the fire license at the
municipal Environmental Secretariat instead than in Belem, the far away capital
of the Para` State.
Interviews with farmers show that the Ipixuna’s program reduced the per-
ception that fire is an exogenous risk leading to a deeper risk involvement and
lower fire risk expectations. The Q methodology application showed that Ipixuna
farmers support the view that a shared intervention (i.e. state and community) is
key to an e↵ective fire control.
6.3. Policy implications and future research
Municipal governments in the Amazon should care about controlling fire risk
not only for environmental and public health reasons, but for economic reasons,
that is unfold the option of investing beyond non fire sensitive crops, providing
farmers with the opportunity of a fire-free agriculture. This may reduce poverty
among smallholders, and reduce dependence from external subsidies that have
insignificant and sometimes negative e↵ects on the decision to control fire and
ultimately on environmental and economic sustainability.
Up to now policies aiming to limit fire incidence have ‘individualized’ the fire
issue. More e↵ective policies must internalize the collective dimension and the
interdependency issue linked to fire control and take into account farmers’ mental
models in order to improve collective action likelihood locally. For this purpose
policy maker should adopt provisions for trust building and reduce the cost of
compliance.
Trust building may takes place facilitating monitoring and sanctioning activity.
Institutions must make farmers responsible for controlling fire, creating a shared
mental model favorable to collective action. Sanctioners’ legitimacy must improve
through institutions providing compensation mechanisms and increasing reporting
and grievance redressal opportunities.
In order to reduce the costs of fire control and compliance to the law, local
government must provide information and adequate resources in degraded area
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with low forest cover. As other works already suggested (Carmenta 2013; Bron-
dizio and Moran, 2008), when fire risk increase (i.e. during drought and extreme
climatic events), government must increase monitoring and information e↵ort.
In the end local government must avoid drastic regulation such as Paragominas’
law forbidding fire use. This increase the policy-practice gap and reduce farmers’
compliance by crowding out motivation to control fire. Vice-versa a supporting
regulation such as a correct implementation of the fire licensing system would make
farmers responsible for controlling fire and increase the likelihood of collective
action. In pursuing this it would be good to make the license release as close
as possible to the farmers. Local government may invest in special fire o cers
delegated of releasing fire licenses and receiving complaints from farmers su↵ering
damages. These o cers may also supervise and eventually provide consultancy
on fire use. Moreover in case of accidents they may implement conflict manage-
ment techniques or report to the authorities such as the local police or IBAMA
(Brazilian Environmental Agency). Fire o cers must be operating during the
whole fire season and can be located in each rural school or rural health unit. This
intervention is likely to be more e↵ective than mere training of farmers: increas-
ing governmental and peer pressure for cooperation, improving the likelihood of
collective action for fire control.
New avenues for future research include a cost benefit and political economy
analysis of fire control policies. Future investigations need to assess the e↵ective
benefits of fire mitigation policies, whether local government are e↵ectively inter-
ested in reducing fires and which is the optimal scale for policy implementation.
Fruitful linkages may emerge with policies and programs oriented to improve
production capacity within the boundaries of forest conservation. On the other
hand an evaluation of costs and benefits of fire control is particularly challenging
since few data exists about the area and type of landscape burnt, and few studies
have proven able to link remote sensing data (hotspots and scars) with survey
data. Moreover there is no study measuring the e↵ectiveness of current fire control
investments yet.
Future investigation may also compare the e↵ects of policies for forest conserva-
tion based on trust building and collective action, and those based on Payment for
Environmental Services (PES). Recent research and policies for forest conservation
concentrated on PES as a tool to influence land use decisions. However fires are
considered as contextual issues and a threat for the REDD+ scheme1 rather than
1 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation plus Conservation:
http://www.un-redd.org/ .
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normal issue to deal with in forest conservation. Future research may explore
under which conditions PES and policies for collective action may establish fruitful
complementarities.
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Appendix A
Semi-structured interviews
canvas
1. How did you get here? Can you tell me the history of the community? What
are the main crops here? How are you organized to sell production? Are there
many fire accidents in the region? Do you know people experimenting tractor
use or other techniques alternative to fire? What do you think about alternative
techniques to fire use?
2. What do you produce? Do you have infrastructures on your property? How
do you sell your production? Do you have other income sources?
3. How was this place at your arrival? Did you always produced the same
things? Have you ever changed? Why?
4. Do you practice slash and burn? How do you burn? Are you usually
satisfied with burn?
5. Which prevention measures do you implement?
6. Do you also implement defence measures?
7. Do you remember the years in which the biggest fire occurred? Did you
experienced damages to your property? May you list the damages you experienced?
Do you think today there is the same fire risk? It gets worst or ameliorates?
8. Have you ever experienced fire accidents with your neighbors? How is it
going with them? What happened? How are you organized to face fires?
9. What do the other members of the community did during the accidents?
10. May you describe the community, the association and the other organiza-
tions in the community? Are there special agreements regarding production or
fire use in the community?
11. Have you already tried to set up rules for fire use with your neighbors?
12. Have you already experienced fire trainings in the community? What do
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you think about? What to you think about what they say on television and on
radio about fire use and fires?
13. Do you think there is need for more rules? What do you think about
government policies and laws about fire use and control? Which do you think is
the role of the community and which the one of public bodies in preventing fires?
14. If there was no more fire risk would you change your production system?
Why? Do you think you would yield more money?
15. What do you think about the future of the community?
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Appendix B
List of variables used in the
models
In order of citation
  internal endogenous risk
 external exogenous fire risk
⇢ external endogenous fire risk
  likelihood of collective action
Z vector of exogenous variables a↵ecting collective action
p fire risk
La productive labor
LP the amount of labor allocated to fire production
Y income
  losses
U utility
QA amount of type A crop
QB amount of type B crop
QA price of type A crop
QB price of type B crop
KA production cost of A crop
KB production costs of B crop
UF utility in case of fire event
U0 utility in case of non fire event
X vector of non agricultural goods
N amount consumed of non timber forest products
⌦ vector of household features
l leisure
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T total time endowment
LN labor allocated to the production of NTFPs
LA labor allocated to the production of A crops
LB labor allocated to the production of B crops
SA area allocated to the production of A crops
SB area allocated to the production of B crops
SF area of forest
S total land endowment
I exogenous income
↵ protective e↵ect of fire prevention measures
K capital
Wh wage rate of hired labor
Px vector of prices of non agricultural goods
P relative price (PA numeraire)
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Appendix C
Estimates results
Additional summary statistics
This section report summary statistics for dataset corresponding to each model.
Table C.1: Summary statistics: Firebreaks (0/1) and Firebreaks (Days)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
firebreaks 01 0.818 0.387 0 1
firebreaks days 4.527 5.343 0 30
manioc flour price 1.159 0.336 0.541 1.601
pepper price 3.228 0.406 2.747 4.194
gov transfer 0.723 0.432 0 1
church 0.662 0.459 0 1
n association 1.055 0.811 0 3
neighbors trust 2.797 0.46 1 3
neighbors help 0.064 0.245 0 1
training 0.218 0.415 0 1
n children 1.518 1.89 0 10
n men 1.545 1.29 0 6
a pri forest 15.991 29.428 0 200
a sec forest 19.642 21.916 0 119.13
a pasture 6.63 13.675 0 95.600
a annual 1.947 1.833 0 10
a perennial 0.358 0.841 0 5
N 110
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Table C.2: Summary statistics: Backfire
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
backfire 0.621 0.487 0 1
manioc flour price 1.192 0.331 0.541 1.601
pepper price 3.232 0.423 2.623 4.206
church 0.656 0.46 0 1
n association 1.021 0.782 0 3
neighbors trust 2.801 0.443 1 3
neighbors help 0.064 0.246 0 1
training 0.207 0.407 0 1
education 0.079 0.27 0 1
n children 1.464 1.781 0 10
n men 1.493 1.267 0 6
a pri forest 15.195 28.372 0 200
a sec forest 18.601 20.776 0 119.13
a pasture 5.488 12.217 0 95.600
a annual 1.815 1.746 0 10
a perennial 0.465 1.348 0 12.5
N 140
Table C.3: Summary statistics: Alert neighbors
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
alert neighbors 0.818 0.388 0 1
manioc flour price 1.183 0.329 0.541 1.601
pepper price 3.237 0.425 2.623 4.206
gov transfer 0.745 0.417 0 1
church 0.645 0.465 0 1
n association 1.022 0.771 0 3
neighbors trust 2.797 0.447 1 3
training 0.212 0.41 0 1
education 0.073 0.261 0 1
n children 1.496 1.799 0 10
n men 1.496 1.273 0 6
a pri forest 16.002 28.846 0 200
a sec forest 18.944 20.862 0 119.13
a pasture 5.878 12.585 0 95.600
a annual 1.814 1.744 0 10
a perennial 0.462 1.357 0 12.5
N 137
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Table C.4: Summary statistics: Late hours
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
late hours 0.099 0.3 0 1 181
manioc flour price 1.195 0.328 0.541 1.601 169
pepper price 3.193 0.395 2.623 4.206 181
gov transfer 0.74 0.424 0 1 181
church 0.641 0.462 0 1 181
neighbors trust 2.813 0.425 1 3 181
neighbors help 0.063 0.243 0 1 176
training 0.193 0.396 0 1 181
education 0.077 0.268 0 1 181
n children 1.503 1.928 0 14 181
n men 1.448 1.271 0 6 181
a pri forest 13.472 26.126 0 200 181
a sec forest 17.556 19.331 0 119.13 181
a pasture 5.782 12.032 0 95.600 181
a annual 1.652 1.694 0 10 181
a perennial 0.414 1.211 0 12.5 181
Table C.5: Summary statistics: Number of fire control measures implemented
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
n fcm 2.815 1.232 0 5
manioc flour price 1.157 0.339 0.541 1.601
pepper price 3.221 0.402 2.747 4.194
gov transfer 0.722 0.435 0 1
church 0.674 0.454 0 1
n association 1.056 0.818 0 3
neighbors trust 2.802 0.458 1 3
neighbors help 0.065 0.247 0 1
training 0.222 0.418 0 1
education 0.074 0.263 0 1
n children 1.463 1.831 0 10
n men 1.537 1.3 0 6
a pri forest 15.704 29.31 0 200
a sec forest 19.285 21.774 0 119.13
a pasture 6.418 13.486 0 95.600
a annual 1.944 1.849 0 10
a perennial 0.362 0.848 0 5
N 108
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Estimates details
This section reports estimates of all the models presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.
We add also estimates with n men in log form of burning after the rain (Table
C.13) and of the number of daywork devoted to build fire control measures (Table
C.14). Finally, in Table C.15 we report the average marginal e↵ects for all Probit
models. All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Table C.6: Probit estimation results : Firebreaks
Variable Coe cient (Std. Err.)
manioc flour price 0.884 (0.588)
pepper price 1.123⇤ (0.516)
gov transfer -0.039 (0.329)
church 0.308 (0.364)
n association 0.393† (0.236)
neighbors trust 1.094⇤⇤ (0.347)
neighbors help 0.114 (0.691)
training -0.095 (0.479)
n children -0.064 (0.081)
n men 0.058 (0.131)
a pri forest -0.004 (0.007)
a sec forest 0.019⇤ (0.009)
a pasture 0.000 (0.018)
a annual 0.014 (0.099)
a perennial 0.377† (0.220)
Intercept -7.561⇤⇤ (1.983)
N 110
Log-likelihood -38.15
 2(15) 34.417
Significance levels : † : 10% ⇤ : 5% ⇤⇤ : 1%
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Table C.7: Probit estimation results : Backfire
Variable Coe cient (Std. Err.)
manioc flour price 1.372⇤⇤ (0.471)
pepper price -0.259 (0.321)
church 0.599⇤ (0.275)
n association 0.187 (0.178)
neighbors trust 0.505† (0.272)
neighbors help 1.258⇤ (0.579)
training 0.029 (0.304)
education 0.048 (0.465)
n children -0.020 (0.070)
n men -0.140 (0.108)
a pri forest -0.008 (0.005)
a sec forest 0.030⇤⇤ (0.009)
a pasture 0.033⇤ (0.015)
a annual -0.070 (0.075)
a perennial 0.068 (0.102)
Intercept -2.738⇤ (1.361)
N 140
Log-likelihood -75.621
 2(15) 32.592
Significance levels : † : 10% ⇤ : 5% ⇤⇤ : 1%
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Table C.8: Probit estimation results: Alert neighbors
Variable Coe cient (Std. Err.)
manioc flour price 1.259⇤ (0.571)
pepper price 1.121⇤ (0.438)
gov transfer -0.464 (0.333)
church 0.689⇤ (0.335)
n association -0.045 (0.188)
neighbors trust 0.589 (0.360)
training 0.542 (0.410)
education -0.206 (0.539)
n children -0.061 (0.085)
n men 0.180 (0.133)
a pri forest -0.004 (0.006)
a sec forest -0.005 (0.007)
a pasture -0.027⇤ (0.012)
a annual 0.192⇤ (0.093)
a perennial 0.032 (0.090)
Intercept -5.908⇤⇤ (2.004)
N 137
Log-likelihood -45.396
 2(15) 38.467
Significance levels : † : 10% ⇤ : 5% ⇤⇤ : 1%
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Table C.9: Probit estimation results: After rain
Variable Coe cient (Std. Err.)
manioc flour price 1.010⇤ (0.469)
pepper price 0.798⇤ (0.326)
gov transfer 0.523† (0.295)
church 0.067 (0.285)
n association 0.306† (0.175)
neighbors trust -0.094 (0.265)
neighbors help 1.149 (0.738)
training 0.483 (0.322)
education 0.207 (0.500)
n children -0.007 (0.064)
n men 0.066 (0.101)
a pri forest 0.005 (0.005)
a sec forest 0.000 (0.008)
a pasture -0.013 (0.012)
a annual -0.015 (0.071)
a perennial 0.130 (0.079)
Intercept -4.447⇤⇤ (1.304)
N 134
Log-likelihood -70.935
 2(16) 39.651
Significance levels : † : 10% ⇤ : 5% ⇤⇤ : 1%
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Table C.10: Probit estimation results: Late hours
Variable Coe cient (Std. Err.)
manioc flour price 2.049 (1.625)
pepper price -5.795⇤ (2.559)
gov transfer 1.420 (0.888)
church 0.012 (0.845)
neighbors trust 2.772† (1.474)
neighbors help 0.535 (0.706)
training 1.996⇤⇤ (0.617)
education 1.370 (0.880)
n children -0.741⇤⇤ (0.240)
n men -0.168 (0.146)
a pri forest -0.274⇤⇤ (0.096)
a sec forest -0.008 (0.010)
a pasture 0.127⇤⇤ (0.040)
a annual -1.086⇤⇤ (0.398)
a perennial 1.077⇤⇤ (0.351)
Intercept 4.043 (3.904)
N 164
Log-likelihood -9.875
 2(15) 43.876
Significance levels : † : 10% ⇤ : 5% ⇤⇤ : 1%
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Table C.11: Poisson estimation results: Firebreaks days
Variable Coe cient (Std. Err.)
manioc flour price -0.006 (0.447)
pepper price 0.107 (0.297)
gov transfer 0.133 (0.298)
church 0.358† (0.198)
n association 0.143† (0.085)
neighbors trust 0.816⇤⇤ (0.250)
neighbors help 0.212 (0.290)
training 0.178 (0.307)
education -0.204 (0.398)
n children -0.153⇤⇤ (0.050)
n men 0.063 (0.089)
a pri forest -0.002 (0.002)
a sec forest 0.002 (0.004)
a pasture 0.007 (0.007)
a annual 0.195⇤⇤ (0.041)
a perennial -0.015 (0.095)
Intercept -2.110† (1.116)
N 110
Log-likelihood -328.381
 2(16) 72.092
Significance levels : † : 10% ⇤ : 5% ⇤⇤ : 1%
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Table C.12: Poisson estimation results: n fcm
Variable Coe cient (Std. Err.)
manioc flour price 0.585⇤⇤ (0.170)
pepper price 0.162† (0.091)
gov transfer 0.022 (0.090)
church 0.135 (0.091)
n association 0.059 (0.043)
neighbors trust 0.375⇤⇤ (0.127)
neighbors help 0.315⇤ (0.131)
training 0.114 (0.075)
education 0.089 (0.135)
n children -0.032 (0.029)
n men 0.020 (0.031)
a pri forest 0.000 (0.001)
a sec forest 0.003 (0.002)
a pasture 0.002 (0.003)
a annual 0.017 (0.020)
a perennial 0.022 (0.042)
Intercept -1.588⇤⇤ (0.493)
N 108
Log-likelihood -174.567
 2(16) 52.246
Significance levels : † : 10% ⇤ : 5% ⇤⇤ : 1%
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Table C.13: Probit estimation results: After rain (with diminishing return on
labor)
Variable Coe cient (Std. Err.)
manioc flour price 0.866 (0.560)
pepper price 0.949⇤⇤ (0.349)
gov transfer 0.463 (0.332)
church 0.195 (0.334)
n association 0.149 (0.206)
neighbors trust -0.057 (0.273)
neighbors help 1.127 (0.722)
training 0.194 (0.349)
education -0.029 (0.545)
n children 0.051 (0.067)
log n men 0.664⇤ (0.277)
a pri forest 0.003 (0.006)
a sec forest -0.003 (0.007)
a pasture -0.005 (0.014)
a annual -0.061 (0.073)
a perennial 0.168 (0.142)
Intercept -4.994⇤⇤ (1.395)
N 106
Log-likelihood -56.839
 2(16) 34.386
Significance levels : † : 10% ⇤ : 5% ⇤⇤ : 1%
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Table C.14: Poisson estimation results: Firebreaks days (with diminishing return
on labor)
Variable Coe cient (Std. Err.)
manioc flour price 0.123 (0.446)
pepper price 0.345 (0.258)
gov transfer 0.104 (0.341)
church 0.295 (0.182)
n association -0.080 (0.109)
neighbors trust 0.729⇤⇤ (0.216)
neighbors help 0.670⇤⇤ (0.226)
training -0.045 (0.208)
education -0.154 (0.366)
n children -0.082† (0.044)
log n men 0.415⇤ (0.174)
a pri forest -0.005⇤ (0.002)
a sec forest 0.001 (0.004)
a pasture 0.010 (0.007)
a annual 0.123⇤⇤ (0.040)
a perennial 0.185⇤ (0.089)
Intercept -2.629⇤ (1.126)
N 89
Log-likelihood -230.224
 2(16) 70.803
Significance levels : † : 10% ⇤ : 5% ⇤⇤ : 1%
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Appendix D
Technical notes on Q
methodology
The whole routine used to analyse data is made up of the following steps:
1 Organize data in a SxN matrix (in our case R=17, N=56), with statements
in raw and Q sorts by column.
2 Perform factor analysis on Q sorts (we used the Stata command factor).
3 Perform factor rotation (we used Stata command rotate which perform a
varimax rotation).
4 Calculate a sort significant threshold and define significant sorts.
5 Select an adequate number of factors.
6 Assess factor reliance.
7 Obtain normalized factor scores (Table 5.3).
8 Asses most distinguished statements.
9 Cross the individuated factors with relevant features of the individuals whose
Q sort belong to the individuated factor (Table 5.4).
Steps 1 to 3 and 5 are straight or discussed in Chapter 5. Step 9 is described
in the footnote to Table 5.4. Here we discuss steps 4, 6, 7 and 8.
Calculate a sort significant threshold and define
significant sorts
Calculating sort significance is important to understand which sorts are significant
variants and which are not. Sort whose factor loading surpassed a threshold
indicating that sort significance was greater or equal to 99% on that factor were
considered significant on that factor. Q sort that is not significant on any of the
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selected factor is dropped from the analysis. This means that further discourses
exist, but in our sample there is no su cient variance to aggregate them on a
single factor.
According to Brown (1980) the threshold to decide factor significance can be
calculated with the formula:
T =
zp
N
where z is the value of the standard normal PDF use to set significance, in our
case is 2,58; and N is the number of sorts included in the sample, in our case 56.
So we considered significant only those sort whose factor loading where positive
and exceeded T=0,345.
Assess factor reliance
How much each sort really reflect the discourse of the person whose sort load on
that factor? Brown (1980) suggests that the reliability of a person with himself is
around 80%. Repeating the same ranking exercise several times individual will
change opinion once over five statements.
Then the reliability of a factor with itself can be estimated as:
rxx =
0.80p
1 + (p  1)0.80
where p is the number of person whose sorts load significantly on that factors
or that in Brown’s words “define the factor”. The more persons will define that
factor the more the factor is reliable.
Obtain normalized factor scores
Normalized factors score are obtained as a weighted average of the sort significantly
loading on a factor. The weight is w = f(1 f2) . Scores are then normalized
subtracting score average and score means for each factor. This allow to evidence
most contrasting statements.
132
Assess most distinguished statements
In order to assess if two sort are significantly di↵erent we must build a test. We
proceed by computing standard errors of factor score: SEfs = sx(1  rxx) where
sx is the standard error of the forced distribution. Since we standardized factor
scores we used sx = 1.
Then we compute the standard error of the di↵erence between two factor
scores:
SEDx y =
q
SE2x   SE2y
If the di↵erence between two scores is higher than zSEDx y, then the two scores
are significantly di↵erent at the level of significance set by setting z: p < 0.1 for
z = 1.65; p < 0.05 for z = 1.96; p < 0.01 for z = 2.58.
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